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INTRODUCTION 
Stop-and-frisk is a common and important investigative tactic for law en-
forcement officers across the United States.1 Controversially, however, stop-and-
frisk morphed into an aggressive crime-control strategy quite different from the 
tactic outlined in Terry v. Ohio.2 Part of this transformation is a function of courts 
having expanded law enforcement authority to conduct stops beyond the limited 
circumstances set forth in the Terry decision.3 But an equally, if not more im-
portant reason for this change in the use of stop-and-frisk concerns how urban 
police departments began using the tactic in the early 1990s to combat the rise 
in violent crime rates across the United States.4 
No law enforcement agency used stop-and-frisk as a comprehensive crime-
control strategy more than the New York Police Department (NYPD). The 
NYPD engaged in approximately five million stops between 2004 and 2013,5 
reaching an annual zenith in 2011 with 685,700 stops.6 The NYPD’s aggressive 
 
1  MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 6–7 (2016); Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, Re-
forming Stop and Frisk, 18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 45, 47–52 (2017). 
2  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
3  Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
4  Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 335, 337, 339 (2014). 
5  Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry 
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 62 (2015). 
6  CHRISTOPHER DUNN, STOP-AND-FRISK 2012, at 3 (Jennifer Carnig ed., 2013), https://www.n 
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use of Stop, Question, and Frisk (“SQF”)7 as a broad crime-control strategy re-
sulted in numerous lawsuits alleging deprivation of New Yorkers’ constitutional 
rights.8 Two of these lawsuits in particular, Daniels v. City of New York9 and 
Floyd v. City of New York,10 were certified as class actions that challenged the 
NYPD’s use of SQF on two constitutional grounds—(1) that both stops and 
frisks were made without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment and (2) that officers selectively targeted people for stops on the basis of 
race and national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. After making extensive findings of 
fact that relied heavily on sophisticated statistical analyses of the NYPD’s own 
SQF data, a federal district court ruled that the NYPD had systematically en-
gaged in unconstitutional SQF practices that targeted predominately Black and 
Hispanic New Yorkers on the basis of their race and ethnicity.11 
Research confirms the decisions in Daniels and Floyd in ways that leave 
little doubt that Black and Hispanic New Yorkers were disproportionately tar-
geted by SQF, resulting in them being far more likely than their White counter-




7  We differentiate the particularized tactic of stop-and-frisk supported by reasonable suspi-
cion under Terry from the New York City Stop, Question, and Frisk strategy by capitalizing 
the latter and referring to it by the acronym “SQF.” We use SQF in the same way that law 
professor Frank Rudy Cooper refers to “programmatic stop and frisk,” which he defines as 
“(1) administratively driven, (2) pervasive, (3) data-enhanced area profiling, using the Terry 
stop and frisk power, for (4) race-, gender-, and age-targeted police seizure and search of ci-
vilians with (5) the purpose of crime prevention.” Frank Rudy Cooper, A Genealogy of Pro-
grammatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2018). 
8  Stop and Frisk Practices, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/en/issues/racial-justice/stop-and-
frisk-practices [https://perma.cc/52YU-UY9B]. 
9  Complaint, Daniels v. City of New York, 1:99-cv-01695-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999); see 
also Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
10  Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1–2, Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-01034-
SAS (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Floyd_Complaint_08.01.31.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/67YT-8H2A]; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), stay granted sub nom. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d 
Cir. 2013), vacated in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014). 
11  Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562. The authors note that Judge Scheindlin was eventually re-
moved from the case by the Second Circuit. Ligon, 538 Fed App’x at 102–03. Importantly, 
however, the appellate court did not make any changes to her findings of fact or conclusions 
of law. Id. And although the appeal was settled before resolution on its merits, Floyd et al. v. 
City of New York et al., CTR. CONST. RTS. (Dec. 24, 2020), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-
we-do/our-cases/floyd-et-al-v-city-new-york-et-al [https://perma.cc/9LLA-2SN2], it is clear 
that Judge Scheindlin’s perceptions of the NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk as an aggressive, 
city-wide strategy for fighting crime were shared by many New Yorkers. Among other things, 
William de Blasio was elected mayor in a landslide after having run on a platform to end the 
strategy. See Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor 
in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/de-
blasio-is-elected-new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/55WN-CKYM]. 
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NYPD.12 When combined with the NYPD’s zero-tolerance approach against so-
cial disorder, SQF severely strained police relations with people of color and 
their communities.13 And the social costs of the strain cannot be overstated.14 
Although there have been improvements to address Fourth Amendment con-
cerns attendant to SQF as a result of the changes Mayor De Blasio and his police 
commissions implemented, questions of racial, ethnic, and sex biases still per-
sist.15 For example, the New York Civil Liberties Union reported that of the 
13,459 people the NYPD stopped during 2019, 59% were Black, 29% were His-
panic, and 9% were White, meaning that nearly nine out of every ten stops in-
volved people of color.16 The present study seeks to unpack these figures by 
 
12  Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public 
Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 706, 712, 718–22 (2012); Joseph Ferrandino, Mi-
nority Threat Hypothesis and NYPD Stop and Frisk Policy, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 209, 210–11 
(2015); Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New Dis-
order in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 593–98, 601–07 
(2010); Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or Prejudice? Understanding 
Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365, 
366–67, 379–81 (2016); Philip J. Levchak, Do Precinct Characteristics Influence Stop-and-
Frisk in New York City? A Multi-Level Analysis of Post-Stop Outcomes, 34 JUST. Q. 377, 377–
80, 402–03 (2017); Weston J. Morrow, Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, After the Stop: 
Exploring the Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Police Use of Force During Terry Stops, 20 POLICE 
Q. 367, 368–69, 371–72 (2017); GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE 
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES iii, xi–xiv, 8, 30 
(2007). 
13  Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 50; cf. Michael D. White, Henry F. Fradella & James R. 
Coldren, Jr., Why Police (and Communities) Need ‘Broken Windows,’ CRIME REP. (Aug. 11, 
2015), http://thecrimereport.org/2015/08/11/2015-08-why-police-and-communities-need-bro 
ken-windows/ [https://perma.cc/GMV5-ZCT4] (explaining how SQF, as implemented by the 
NYPD, strayed far from the central principles of Broken Windows Theory); see also Andrew 
Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on Order Maintenance 
Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 151 (2014) (similarly arguing that Broken Windows 
Theory does not support the way that the NYPD implements SQF as a broad crime-control 
strategy). 
14  Fradella & White, supra note 1, at 51; CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN 
IMPACT 1 (2012), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-re-
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ93-VRTB]; JENNIFER FRATELLO, ANDRES F. RENGIFO, JENNIFER 
TRONE & BRENDA VELAZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUST., COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND FRISK: 




15  See Yasmeen Khan, NYC Has “A Long Way to Go” to End the Illegal Stop-and-Frisk Era, 
GOTHAMIST (Feb. 25, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/nyc-ending-illegal-stop-a 
nd-frisk-era [https://perma.cc/38N7-D3CG] (reporting that, in 2019, “88% of people stopped 
were Black or Latino,” representing a 3% increase from the time the Floyd decision declared 
SQF unconstitutional in 2013). 
16  Stop-and-Frisk Data: Annual Stop-and-Frisk Numbers, NYCLU [hereinafter NYCLU, 
SQF Data], https://www.nyclu.org/en/Stop-and-Frisk-data [https://perma.cc/JR5J-MFTA]; 
cf. NYCLU, STOP-AND-FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 1–2 (2019), [hereinafter NYCLU, DE 
BLASIO ERA] https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_sto 
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examining the specific factors surrounding those stops. By statistically control-
ling for a number of situational factors, this study provides insights into whether 
race, ethnicity, and sex affect the chances of being frisked, searched, and sub-
jected to force during an SQF encounter in New York City. 
This Article is organized in six parts. Part I will trace the origin of stop-and-
frisk authority from its common law roots to the present. Part II will summarize 
the undercurrent of racial injustice in stop-and-frisk practices. Part III will ex-
amine how those issues were particularly problematic in New York City during 
the height of its aggressive SQF crime-control strategy, including summarizing 
some of the consequences of SQF. Part IV will present the research questions of 
the present study and the methodology we use to investigate those questions. Part 
V will present the results of our statistical analyses. And Part VI will discuss our 
findings and the conclusions we draw from them. 
I. STOP-AND-FRISK AUTHORITY17 
Stop-and-frisk as a tactic dates back to English common law.18 During that 
time, English constables and “watchmen,” as well as private citizens, were 
granted the authority to stop people they deemed as suspicious at night.19 During 
the stops, suspicious persons could be legally questioned and even detained “un-
til the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then to be [released], and if suspi-
cion be touching them, they shall be delivered to the sheriff.”20 
This same authority was adopted in the United States, particularly with the 
development of professional police departments. Many local and state courts up-
held the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk authority over the years, but often 
there were substantial differences in application, which created variation among 
the states in how police utilized the tactic.21 These differences eventually 
prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter in a triumvirate of 
cases in 1968 that set federal constitutional benchmarks for stop-and-frisk within 
the framework of the Fourth Amendment: Terry v. Ohio22 and the companion 
 
pfrisk_singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/W25M-QSA2] (analyzing NYPD SQF activities between 
2014 and 2017 and reporting that Black and Hispanic males between the ages of fourteen and 
twenty-four accounted for 38% of reported stops even though they comprised only 5% of the 
city’s population). 
17  Portions of Part I are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 43–79, and Mi-
chael D. White, Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Douglas Mellom, Federal Civil Lit-
igation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the 
Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 15–22 
(2016). 
18  John A. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Law, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 211, 214 (1964). 
19  1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 229 (8th ed. 1824). 
20  2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 96 (Robert H. Small ed., 
1847); see also Lawrence v. Hedger [1810] 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P.). 
21  Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 318–24 (1942). 
22  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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cases of Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York.23 Collectively, these rulings 
afforded police the discretion to stop citizens based on reasonable suspicion. This 
standard of proof required more than a mere hunch but less evidence than prob-
able cause; it is satisfied when a law enforcement officer can “point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant” a brief, limited stop to investigate whether criminal 
activity is afoot.24 These cases also made clear that law enforcement officers may 
superficially “pat down” a suspect if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the 
suspect is armed.25 Such frisks are limited to cursory inspections for weapons 
and, therefore, may not involve a “general exploratory search for whatever evi-
dence of criminal activity he might find.”26 
Justice William Douglas wrote the lone dissenting opinion in Terry. He re-
jected the notion that the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment could 
provide a basis to support stop-and-frisk outside the usual probable cause stand-
ard.27 Indeed, Douglas presciently cautioned that the reasonable suspicion stand-
ard—one so low that it would not justify a magistrate issuing a warrant—would 
not ring a “bell of certainty.”28 Rather, such a low and amorphous standard would 
be a blank check for law enforcement officers to exercise nearly unbridled dis-
cretion without regard to constitutional protections.29 
Perhaps as reaction to the concerns Douglas raised in his dissent in Terry, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s majority opinion in the case was written very cau-
tiously and narrowly.30 The opinion could have been applied in a manner limited 
to police safety stops. But through subsequent cases—most notably Adams v. 
Williams31 and Delaware v. Prouse32—Terry gradually was interpreted as grant-
ing police expansive “stop” authority to conduct broader, more general investi-
gative detentions than their English common-law counterparts, which were 
 
23  Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1968). 
24  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
25  Id. at 8. 
26  Id. at 30. For an interesting discussion of how expanding Second Amendment rights pose 
challenges for frisks, see Shawn E. Fields, Stop and Frisk in a Concealed Carry World, 93 
WASH. L. REV. 1675, 1694–95 (2018). 
27  Terry, 392 U.S. at 35–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
28  Id. at 37. 
29  Id. at 38–39. 
30  Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara 
and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 395, 401, 404, 423 (1988). 
31  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S 143, 147 (1972) (upholding a vehicle stop and a “frisk” of a 
car for a handgun that was found exactly where an informant had told the officer it would be 
found). 
32  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650–52 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional random spot 
checks of cars made without a pre-established protocol, but in doing so, paving the way for 
Terry’s stop authority upon reasonable suspicion to justify systematic roadblocks that foster 
traffic safety); see also, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454–55 (1990). 
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confined to night-time detentions to prevent breaches of the peace.33 Moreover, 
those who made arrests under English common-law authority were subject to 
liability for false imprisonment if the overnight detention was not justified.34 As 
Rosenthal noted, “[u]nder the contemporary qualified immunity doctrine, in con-
trast, officers face no personal liability even if they violate Fourth Amendment 
standards, as long as their judgment under the circumstances is considered rea-
sonable.”35 Courts assess the validity of stop-and-frisks under the reasonable sus-
picion standard by considering “the whole picture”—all of the facts known under 
the “totality of the circumstances.”36 Importantly, judges are supposed to defer 
to the professional judgment and experience of police when assessing the totality 
of the circumstances.37 
Throughout the 1980s, the Court exempted several classes of stops from the 
usual requirements of Terry.38 For example, in United States v. Mendenhall, the 
Court ruled that a stop had not occurred when federal agents approached the de-
fendant in the open concourse area of an airport.39 Because the agents neither 
wore uniforms nor displayed weapons and because they requested—but did not 
demand—to see the defendant’s ticket and identification, the Court reasoned that 
the encounter did not constitute a stop that qualified as a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.40 Rather, the stop was deemed a voluntary and coopera-
tive encounter because at no time should a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
 
33  Ronayne, supra note 18, at 213–15. Frank Rudy Cooper notes that the expansion of Terry 
beyond its original confines is attributable, in part, to the law-and-order “backlash against the 
1960s civil right movements” and its attendant calls for “heightened crime control” in the 
1970s and 1980s. Cooper, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
34  Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case against Terry v. Ohio, 
43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 299, 332–33 (2010). 
35  Id. at 333. 
36  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
37  Id. at 421–22 (emphasizing that the relevant line of inquiry in the case was “whether, based 
upon the whole picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could reasonably surmise 
that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity”). For an analysis of 
how deference to police experience factors into the reasonable suspicion standard, see David 
A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and 
Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 666 (1994). 
38  At first blush, the cases discussed in the remainder of Part I may appear to lack a common 
thread other than expanding stop-and-frisk authority. But there is a theoretical connection be-
tween Terry and these cases if Terry is viewed as having accomplished more than authorizing 
stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Terry severed the Reasonableness 
Clause from the Warrant Clause, thereby carving out swathes of police conduct exempt from 
both the requirements of probable cause and a warrant. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. 
Ohio, The Warren Court and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894–95, 898 (1998); Luis G. Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The Rea-
sonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV. 33, 44–46 (1979–80). Thus, all of the 
cases highlighted in the remainder of Part I were decided with regard to a balancing test aimed 
at “reasonableness” divorced from other Fourth Amendment principles. 
39  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980). 
40  Id. 
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situation have ever felt that she could not leave.41 Then, in I.N.S. v. Delgado, the 
“free to leave” test morphed into something even more restrictive on personal 
liberty. Specifically, the Court reasoned that because workers were free to con-
tinue working and moving about a factory while armed agents wearing badges 
roamed the premises questioning people about their immigration status, the 
workers were not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.42 The 
Court further narrowed Terry in Florida v. Bostick when it clarified that law en-
forcement officers have the authority to stop and ask basic investigatory ques-
tions—including requests to examine identification or to search the luggage of 
bus passengers—without there being a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes 
“as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their re-
quests is required.”43 In short, Bostick interpreted Mendenhall’s free to leave test 
by narrowing the inquiry regarding coercive demonstrations of police authority; 
specifically, the Bostick interpretation views police action from the perspective 
of a “reasonable, innocent person.”44 
In other cases, the Supreme Court extended the authority of police to conduct 
frisks. Consider that in Michigan v. Long, the Court permitted the police to con-
duct a brief search of the passenger compartment of a car to look for hidden 
weapons.45 
Perhaps most importantly, the Court has partially retreated from the notion 
that reasonable suspicion needs to be based on more than just hunches. In Ala-
bama v. White, the Court upheld a stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip, 
even though there was no indication of the reliability of the tip.46 That decision 
paved the way for Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, which authorized 
sobriety checkpoints at which police stopped drivers without any particularized 
suspicion of driving while impaired.47 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court approved 
of officers making an inference of suspicion after a suspect fled48—an inference 
that logically extends to any type of evasive behavior.49 Whren v. United States 
 
41  Id. 
42  I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217–18 (1984). 
43  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991). 
44  Id. at 437–38. 
45  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983). 
46  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990). 
47  Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). In City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), the Court curtailed law enforcement authority to use drug-sniff-
ing dogs at roadblocks on the grounds that the DUI checkpoints sanctioned in Sitz were “de-
signed to serve special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” id. at 37 (internal 
quotations omitted); whereas suspicionless searches using drug-sniffing dogs at roadblocks 
impermissibly extended into the realm of investigating “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id. 
at 38. Nonetheless, Sitz remains good law insofar as it permits stops of vehicles at DUI check-
points without any particularized suspicion of impaired driving. 
48  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
49  Hundreds of cases have relied on evasion in a high-crime area to justify Terry stops. See 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring 
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upheld pretextual stops, thereby allowing police to conduct stops for minor in-
fractions so they could investigate other, more serious crimes.50 And because 
Minnesota v. Dickerson approved of the so-called “plain feel” exception,51 police 
likely have an incentive to frisk people even when they do not actually fear the 
presence of a weapon,52 but rather hope to feel some drugs in the pat-down—a 
seemingly permissible pretext in light of Whren.53 Notably, Justice Antonin 
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Dickerson in which he expressed doubts 
about the constitutionality of Terry as applied to “frisks” because it exceeded the 
scope of authority granted to watchmen under English night-walker statutes.54 
Scalia expressed doubt that “the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth 
Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion 
of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity.”55 In other words, where we 
are today with stop-and-frisk authority under Terry is not necessarily a preor-
dained constitutional conclusion. 
In short, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has steadily expanded the author-
ity to conduct stop-and-frisks since the early 1980s. Notably, this expanded au-
thority increased the risk that officers would employ racial, ethnic, and socioec-
onomic class stereotypes as part of a calculus of suspicion to initiate stop-and-
frisks.56 The expansion of this authority, and the increased risk of racial profiling, 
is especially problematic when considering the persistent undercurrent of racial 
injustice throughout nearly two centuries of American policing—an undercur-
rent that is even evident in the Terry decision itself.57 
 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1590 n.10 (2008). 
50  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996). 
51  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 (1993). 
52  To be clear, we are not suggesting that Whren led to Dickerson. In Sibron, the Court held 
that the test is whether a reasonable person would find a frisk to be justified under the circum-
stances, regardless of whether the particular officer conducting the frisk subjectively believed 
it was justified. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968). Whren passed up the opportunity 
to alter Sibron by applying the “reasonableness” analysis to pretextual stops where an officer 
stops someone in a situation in which no other officer would do so. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
Because Whren failed to find such action unreasonable, our point is that the combination of 
Dickerson and Whren—the combination of “plain feel” without the ability to challenge a frisk 
as being pretextual—created an incentive for law enforcement officers to conduct frisks even 
when they do not suspect the presence of a weapon. 
53  Janet Koven Levit called such pretexts “the Death of Terry v. Ohio.” Janet Koven Levit, 
Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 145, 145 (1996); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Un-
constitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 893–94 (2015). 
54  Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
55  Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
56  See Cooper, supra note 7, at 55–56 (arguing that Terry evolved into “little more than a 
speed bump for aggressive police departments” especially in high-crime areas where the prev-
alence of crime became “the principal rationale for blanketing [B]lack and Latinx communi-
ties with stops and frisks”). 
57  Id. at 55 (noting the racial issues in Terry that were not acknowledged in the decision). 
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II. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE UNDERCURRENT OF RACIAL INJUSTICE58 
An undercurrent of racial injustice and discrimination has served as a back-
drop in professional policing in the United States for the last 175 years.59 The 
larger race relation problems that have defined American policing provide an 
important lens through which to view the rulings in Terry and subsequent cases, 
as well as the increasing reliance on mass stop-and-frisk programs in New York 
and elsewhere. 
A. Racial Issues in Terry v. Ohio 
In his opinion in Terry, Chief Justice Warren noted that stop-and-frisk ac-
tivities by police contributed to racial strife: 
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts 
to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police 
activity—issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court. 
Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments 
pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the 
police to “stop and frisk”—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—suspicious 
persons.60 
The opinions in Terry, however, omitted or glossed over several important 
facts relevant to the racial issues underlying the case. Indeed, nowhere in any of 
the opinions in Terry does any justice mention that both Terry and his co-defend-
ant, Chilton, were Black men.61 Nor does any justice mention that a third man, 
Katz—a White man whom a police officer observed interacting with Terry and 
Chilton—was not charged; he was held as a “suspicious person” and released 
after two days.62 According to the transcript of the trial court’s suppression hear-
ing in Terry, the officer testified that when he saw the men standing on the street, 
“they didn’t look right to [him] at the time.”63 Criminologists Delores Jones-
Brown and Brian Maule suggested that his attention may have been drawn to the 
 
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] believed that the 
Terry case had so much racial significance that it wanted to participate in the oral argument. The 
Supreme Court denied this request, and the racial consequences of its decision were not dwelt 
upon. The fact that Mr. Terry was African-American is never mentioned in the opinion. 
Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 59 (2014). 
58  Portions of Part II are adapted from WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 147–86, and from 
White et al., supra note 17, at 22–29. 
59  WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 9–12, 159–61. 
60  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1968). 
61  Id. at 4–6; see also John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the 
Supreme Court’s Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749 app. B at 1389 (1998). 
62  Terry, 392 U.S. at 7; see also Transcript of Trial, State v. Chilton, No. 79432 (Cuyahoga 
Ct. C.P. Sept. 29, 1964), reprinted in Barrett, supra note 61 app. B at 1464–65. 
63  Barrett, supra note 62, at 1456. 
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men on account of their race.64 This conclusion is bolstered by a number of am-
biguities and inconsistencies in the officer’s account of the case. He could not 
explain why he was initially suspicious of the men; he repeatedly changed the 
number of trips the men made up and down the street, and he expressed uncer-
tainty regarding the type of store into which the men were looking.65 Thus, the 
reasonableness of the initial stop appears to be more open to debate than the 
Terry decision suggests. The failure of the Court to address the questionable rea-
sonableness of the stop in Terry illustrates how the very foundation of the rea-
sonable-suspicion standard in American constitutional law masks racially dis-
parate stop-and-frisk practices with the cloak of race neutrality.66 
B. Racial Issues Throughout American Policing 
Police scholars George Kelling and Mark Moore developed a widely cited 
historical framework that contextualizes 150 years of police history into three 
eras: political, reform, and community problem-solving.67 Though the Kelling 
and Moore framework is useful for examining police history, it has been criti-
cized for overlooking the role of racism in professional policing. Hubert Wil-
liams and Patrick Murphy, for example, argue that the origins of U.S. policing 
are rooted in slave patrols in the South and that the advances that have occurred 
through the “reform” and “community problem-solving” eras excluded minority 
citizens.68 In effect, as policing progressed through the political, professional, 
and community problem-solving eras, the minority community was left behind. 
Williams and Murphy referred to this as the “minority view” of policing.69 
The disconnects between police and people of racial and ethnic minority 
backgrounds have a palpable impact on police-citizen encounters. In other 
words, the minority view of policing shapes how people behave. But citizens’ 
perceptions of police are also shaped by local social contexts, especially in 
 
64  Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased Policing: A Review of the Judicial 
and Legislative Literature, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL 
READINGS 140, 145 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds., 2010). 
65  Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 430–
32 (2004). 
66  See Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 612–13 (2012); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth 
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278–79 
(1998). For an in-depth discussion of how racial stereotypes contribute to police officer sus-
picion in the SQF context, see Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow & Michael D. White, 
Terry and SQF Viewed Through the Lens of the Suspicion Heuristic, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 871 
(2016). 
67  GEORGE L. KELLING & MARK H. MOORE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 
NO. 4, THE EVOLVING STRATEGY OF POLICING 1, 2 (1988), http://www.innovations.harvard.ed 
u/sites/default/files/114213.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY8W-G6VF]. 
68  HUBERT WILLIAMS & PATRICK V. MURPHY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON 
POLICING NO. 13, THE EVOLVING STRATEGY OF POLICE: A MINORITY VIEW 1, 1–2 (1990), http:/ 
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/121019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MKE-N6AA]. 
69  Id. at 1. 
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neighborhoods that are characterized by concentrated disadvantage—a socio-
logical concept that encompasses high rates of unemployment, poverty, and fe-
male-headed households; high percentage of the local population being under 
the age of eighteen; and high rates of people receiving public assistance.70 People 
living in such areas experience poor outcomes on a range of life dimensions, 
including poor birth outcomes; decreased mental health; lack of access to healthy 
foods and recreational areas; decreased cognitive abilities; and high rates of child 
maltreatment, teen pregnancy, school dropout, risk-taking behaviors, and violent 
crime.71 Collectively, the concentrated disadvantages common in these commu-
nities often impact residents’ willingness to cooperate with the police: 
There are many potential reasons for this relationship—people in poor communi-
ties may lack bonds with officers and fear retaliation from helping the police, to 
name a few. Neighborhood social context also influences police officer behavior. 
For example, officers are more likely to stop, search, arrest, use coercive force, 
and engage in misconduct in high-crime neighborhoods marked by concentrated 
disadvantage. Therefore, it is safe to say that neighborhoods matter to policing-
related outcomes.72 
Kelling and Moore published their framework in the late 1980s, but the ex-
periences of numerous agencies with stop-and-frisk suggest that Williams and 
Murphy’s “minority view” of policing is still a stark reality. The Philadelphia 
Police Department (PPD) stopped more than 250,000 citizens in 2009, prompt-
ing the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania (ACLU-PA) to file a 
federal lawsuit in November 2010.73 The lawsuit, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 
alleged that the PPD was engaged in racial profiling.74 The litigation resulted in 
a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the PPD that centered on quar-
terly analysis of stop data by the ACLU-PA, appointment of an independent 
monitor, retraining of officers, and new protocols governing stop-and-frisk prac-
tices.75 The ACLU-PA subsequently reported to the court and the settlement 
monitor that although the number of stops had declined by 15%,76 there had been 
 
70  See, e.g., ASS’N OF MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, LIFE COURSE INDICATOR: 
CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE 1 (2013), http://www.amchp.org/programsandtopics/data-as-
sessment/LifeCourseIndicatorDocuments/LC-06_ConcentratedDisad_Final-4-24-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J87X-HCZR]. 
71  Id. at 2. 
72  John A. Shjarback, Justin Nix & Scott E Wolfe, The Ecological Structuring of Police Of-
ficers’ Perceptions of Citizen Cooperation, 64 CRIME & DELINQ. 1143, 1144 (2018) (internal 
citations omitted). 
73  Complaint at 21, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:10-cv-05952-RBS, 2010 WL 
4662865 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010). 
74  Id. at 2.  
75  Settlement Agreement, Class Certification & Consent Decree at 3–5, Bailey v. City of Phil-
adelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), http://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/fiel 
d_documents/bailey_consent_decree_6-21-11_.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX2Z-8NXE]. 
76  Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 4, Bailey v. 
City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.clearinghouse.net/ch 
Docs/public/PN-PA-0013-0003.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFW5-SGEX]. 
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no significant improvement in the quality of stops and frisks. By our analysis, 
pedestrian stops are being made without reasonable suspicion in approximately 
43–47% of the cases . . . . Frisks are being conducted without reasonable suspi-
cion in over 45% of the cases . . . . By race, 76% of the stops were of minorities 
(African-Americans and Latinos) and 85% of the frisks were of minorities. The 
findings as to impermissible stops and frisks are particularly disturbing given the 
fact that the Police Department had the time and resources following the entry of 
the Agreement to re-train its officers on stop and frisk practices and to establish 
supervisory reviews to ensure accountability for practices that failed to meet clear 
mandates under the Agreement.77 
The reports from the ACLU-PA continue to raise questions about the PPD’s 
use of Terry stops. Their 2015 report found that 37% of stops lacked reasonable 
suspicion; contraband was only found in 2% of stops and 5% of frisks; and 
Blacks comprised approximately 72% and 79% of all stops and frisks, respec-
tively, while they made up only 43% of Philadelphia’s population.78 And their 
most recent report (as of the writing of this Article) shows that, although the PPD 
has made substantial progress in aligning its stop-and-frisk practices with con-
stitutional requirements, there are still numerous concerns. The analysis shows 
that 16% percent of all stops and 38% of all frisks were made without reasonable 
suspicion.79 Importantly, the “hit rate” for stop-and-frisks continued to be quite 
low: less than 1% yielded firearms and less than 4% yielded other contraband, 
such as drugs.80 Moreover, the data suggest that stop-and-frisk activity by PPD 
continues to disproportionately affect Black Philadelphians: 
[T]he share of stops without reasonable suspicion is 11% for Whites, 13% for 
Latinos and 18% for Blacks. . . . The share of frisks made without reasonable sus-
picion is . . . highest for minorities, making up 39% of frisks of Blacks and 31% 
of Latino frisks, whereas the rate for Whites is still quite high at 28%. . . . This 
means Blacks are over 50% more likely to be stopped without reasonable suspi-
cion than Whites . . . [and] Blacks are 40% more likely to be frisked without rea-
sonable suspicion than Whites.81 
In 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) 
evaluated six months of stop-and-frisk practices in Newark.82 According to the 
ACLU-NJ, the Newark Police Department conducted an average of 2,093 stops 
 
77  Id. at 4–5 (footnote omitted). 
78  Plaintiffs’ Fifth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 12–19, Bailey 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.aclupa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/field_documents/bailey_fifth_report_2-24-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR7L-ZVD7]. 
79  Plaintiffs’ Tenth Report to Court on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at 
20, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020), https://aclupa.org 
/sites/default/files/field_documents/104_plaintiffs_tenth_report_on_4th_amendment_issues 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JDH-SP5P]. 
80  Id. at 21. 
81  Id. at 10–11. 
82  UDI OFER & ARI ROSMARIN, ACLU OF N.J., STOP-AND-FRISK: A FIRST LOOK 4 (2014), 
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8113/9333/6064/2014_02_25_nwksnf.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B 
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per month from July to December 2013.83 The authors note that this translates to 
a rate of 91 stops per 1,000 residents, a stop rate that was eleven times greater 
than the NYPD stop rate during the same time period.84 The ACLU-NJ report 
also discovered racial disproportionality in stops, as Blacks represented 52% of 
the area’s population but 75% of those who were stopped by Newark police.85 It 
is not possible to evaluate whether anything has changed in the past few years 
because the Newark Police Department has not released stop-and-frisk data since 
2014.86 And Newark is not alone in its lack of transparency. An investigation 
into Terry stops by the Miami Gardens Police Department found that, from 2008 
to 2013, officers had stopped 65,328 individuals—“more than half of the city’s 
population,” including children in playgrounds and senior citizens near their re-
tirement homes.87 Police stopped 250 of these people more than 20 times.88 We 
have not been able to locate any data to update these figures in the years since 
then. 
In 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU-IL) pub-
lished a report claiming that the Chicago Police Department (CPD) had “failed 
to train, supervise and monitor law enforcement in minority communities for 
decades, resulting in a failure to ensure that officers’ use of stop and frisk is 
lawful.”89 These stop-and-frisk stories are consistent with Williams and Mur-
phy’s “minority view” and demonstrate the perpetuation of the undercurrent of 
racial injustice in American policing.90 Notably, the total number of stops in Chi-
cago decreased approximately 80% after the CPD entered into a settlement 
agreement with the ACLU-IL, but there have been no corresponding improve-
ments in addressing racial disparities in stop-and-frisks in the city.91 Specifically, 
 
83  Id. at 6. 
84  Id. at 7. 
85  Id. at 8. 
86  Newark Stop-and-Frisk, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., https://www.aclu-nj.org/theis-
sues/policepractices/newark-stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/87SU-EANF]. 
87  WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 6; Alice Brennan & Dan Lieberman, Florida City’s 
‘Stop and Frisk’ Nabs Thousands of Kids, Finds 5-year-olds ‘Suspicious,’ FUSION (May 9, 
2014, 11:23 AM), http://fusion.tv/story/5568/florida-citys-stop-frisk-nabs-thousands-of-kids-
finds-5-year-olds-suspicious/ [https://perma.cc/BN8U-SRN6]. Reporters found evidence of 
children as young as five years of age being stopped and 982 stops of people aged seventy and 
above. Conor Friedersdorf, The City Where Blacks Suffer Under ‘Stop and Frisk on Steroids’, 
ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/05/where-blac 
ks-suffer-under-stop-and-frisk-on-steroids/371869/ [https://perma.cc/UKP3-TREZ]. 
88  Brennan & Lieberman, supra note 87; Friedersdorf, supra note 87. 
89  ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 2 (2015), http://www.aclu-il.org/sites/de-
fault/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK76-
CDEQ]. 
90  See WILLIAMS & MURPHY, supra note 68, at 1. 
91  ARLANDER KEYS, THE THIRD REPORT ASSESSING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE INVESTIGATORY & PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT 19 (2019), 
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71.8% of all stops in 2016 and 2017 involved Blacks, 20% involved Hispanics, 
and 8.1% involved Whites.92 
These data snapshots demonstrate that many U.S. cities continue to struggle 
with racial and ethnic tensions in police-citizen relationships. But the unique way 
in which stop-and-frisk was implemented in New York City contributed to that 
particular city having one of the most vexing and persistent problems with po-
licing communities of color. 
III. STOP-AND-FRISK AND THE NYPD 
The NYPD story demonstrates how the use of stop-and-frisk as a widespread 
crime-control strategy can go terribly wrong. The story represents a collision 
between a constitutionally permissible tactic used in an unconstitutional manner 
and the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in policing. The next section 
describes how this collision developed. 
A. Crime, Disorder, and Broken Windows 
New York City, like many cities across the United States, experienced a ma-
jor spike in violence, crime, and disorder in the 1980s.93 Much of the violence in 
New York was driven by the emergence of crack cocaine and competition for 
the drug market.94 Homicides climbed steadily from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 
1990.95 At the same time, the subway system and the city itself were struggling 
with rampant social and physical disorder.96 Marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and 
crack cocaine were regularly and openly being sold on street corners and blocks 
and in city parks.97 Kelling and Coles estimated that “[a]pproximately 1,200 to 
2,000 persons a night” were sleeping in the subway system.98 
The New York Transit Authority appointed William Bratton as chief of the 
transit police to address crime and disorder in the subway system.99 Chief Bratton 
partnered with criminologist George Kelling to develop an enforcement strategy 
 
92  Id. 
93  For a full discussion on the NYPD prior to 1994, see generally JAMES LARDNER & THOMAS 
REPPETTO, NYPD: A CITY AND ITS POLICE (2000). 
94  See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Paul S. Heaton, Steven D. Levitt & Kevin M. Murphy, 
Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1651 (2013). 
95  Michael D. White, The New York City Police Department, Its Crime Control Strategies and 
Organizational Changes, 1970-2009, 31 JUST. Q. 74, 79 (2014). 
96  GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 117–18 (1996). 
97  Bruce D. Johnson, Andrew Golub & James E. McCabe, The International Implications of 
Quality-of-Life Policing as Practiced in New York City, 11 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 17, 18 (2010). 
98  KELLING & COLES, supra note 96, at 117. 
99  The Life and Times of Incoming NYPD Commissioner William Bratton, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Dec. 5, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/timeline-new-nypd-com 
missioner-bratton-article-1.1538689 [https://perma.cc/CV6Z-UUHN]. 
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based on Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows Theory100 that targeted low-
level offenses (e.g., turnstile jumping), as well as social and physical disorder 
through frequent arrests and removals from the subway system.101 Broken Win-
dows Theory posits that minor forms of social and physical disorder cause a 
breakdown in informal social control as citizen investment in an area dimin-
ishes.102 As citizens withdraw from the area, the level of disorder increases, and 
the risk for more serious types of crime to emerge becomes greater.103 The theory 
suggests that police focus enforcement efforts on disorder and quality-of-life of-
fenses as a mechanism for reengaging law-abiding citizens’ commitment to the 
area.104 Under Chief Bratton, the transit police adopted a broken-windows-based 
strategy in the subway system.105 Over the next two years, the level of disorder 
dropped dramatically, and felony offenses declined by 30%.106 
In 1993, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed William Brat-
ton as the Commissioner of the NYPD, and Bratton immediately began imple-
mentation of a broken-windows-based strategy throughout New York.107 Two 
policy initiatives defined the NYPD crime-control strategy. First, Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York outlined the Broken Windows Theory and articulated 
an order-maintenance strategy that targeted disorder and quality-of-life offenses 
through systematic and aggressive enforcement strategies (e.g., replicating the 
subway strategy).108 Second, Getting Guns off the Streets of New York109 outlined 
the NYPD’s strategy to reduce gun violence through the seizure of illegal 
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and Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 265 (2000) (citing Jackson Toby, 
Reducing Crime: New York’s Example, WASH. POST, July 23, 1996, at A17). 
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fectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1505 (2014) (positing 
that that the Broken Windows theory “created the conditions under which [SQF] would even-
tually thrive”). 
106  Joanes, supra note 101, at 265. 
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new-york-s-police.html [https://perma.cc/PFC2-NQCH]. 
108  N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 5: RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF 
NEW YORK 38–43 (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/167807NCJRS.pdf [htt 
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firearms and through the intensive investigation of gun-related incidents.110 Stop-
and-frisk emerged as the primary tactic to meet the objectives of both policy 
initiatives.111 
Over the next several years, critics argued that police over-enforced quality-
of-life infractions through a zero-tolerance approach because officers could eas-
ily justify the stops under the reasonable suspicion standard.112 There is no doubt 
that police used “quality-of-life offenses as excuses to fish for drugs, guns, or 
evidence of more serious crime.”113 The effects of the stop-and-frisk program 
were immediate. “From 1993 to 1996 arrests rose by 23%, including a 40% in-
crease in misdemeanor arrests and a 97% increase in drug arrests.”114 The NYPD 
made approximately 40,000 gun-related arrests over a three-year period, result-
ing in the removal of more than 50,000 guns from the streets.115 Stop-and-frisk 
also produced a 500% increase in arrests for marijuana possession compared to 
the previous decade.116 
The NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk increased steadily in the late 1990s and 
into the twenty-first century. In 2003, for example, NYPD officers conducted 
more than 160,000 stop-and-frisks of citizens.117 That same year, the NYPD im-
plemented “Operation Impact,” a hot spots strategy where police commanders 
identified twenty-four high-crime “Impact Zones” that would be targeted with 
“saturation foot patrol in combination with resources from a variety of depart-
mental divisions.”118 Stop-and-frisk activity increased dramatically over the next 
several years, peaking at more than 685,000 in 2011.119 As the frequency of stops 
increased, critics attacked the strategy’s low rates of return.120 Jones-Brown and 
colleagues found that of the 540,320 stops in 2008, just 6% (32,206 stops) re-
sulted in an arrest, and an additional 6.4% (34,802 stops) resulted in a summons; 
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thus, the percentage of “innocent stops”—those not resulting in summons or ar-
rest—accounted for roughly 87.6% of total stops.121 Similarly, the percentage of 
stops resulting in the recovery of a gun dropped by 60% from 0.39% (627 guns 
recovered out of a total of 160,851 stops) in 2003 to 0.15% in 2008 (824 guns 
recovered out of a total of 540,320 stops).122 Furthermore, the percentage of cit-
izen complaints involving stops increased from 24.6% in 2004 to 32.7% in 
2008.123 
As the use of stop-and-frisk expanded dramatically, the NYPD drifted away 
from the central tenets of Broken Windows Theory, and the program devolved 
into a strictly zero-tolerance approach against social disorder such as public 
drunkenness, vandalism, loitering, panhandling, prostitution, and the like.124 In 
other words, rather than focusing on the “amelioration of physical disorder” in 
partnership with the community, the NYPD focused on “interdiction of social 
disorder.”125 These efforts led the NYPD to implement a set of practices that 
encouraged the aggressive pursuit of individuals through stop-and-frisks, rather 
than mutually beneficial interactions with law-abiding citizens.126 This zero-tol-
erance mentality compounded the police department’s disconnect from the com-
munity in a number of important ways. First, the NYPD focused less on prevent-
ing disorder and alternatives to arrest, and more on aggressively removing 
weapons and wanted criminals from the community.127 Second, the NYPD de-
emphasized informal interactions between police and the community in the man-
ner advocated by both community policing principles and Broken Windows The-
ory.128 The lack of police-community engagement was driven in large part by the 
management style that Bratton embraced from the private sector.129 This man-
agement style stressed innovative approaches on management accountability, 
prioritization, and data-driven decision-making.130 One of the primary structural 
modifications to emerge from this management system was Compstat, a system 
“defined by timely and accurate information, rapid deployment of resources, ef-
fective tactics, follow-up, and assessment.”131 Essentially, instead of identifying 
community needs through engagement with residents, the NYPD determined 
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122  Id. at 13 fig.8B. 
123  Id. at 14 fig.9. 
124  Waldeck, supra note 113, at 1273–74. 
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community needs through its own data-driven accountability system (i.e., 
Compstat). 
B. Crime Control Benefits 
During the same time that the NYPD implemented its order-maintenance 
strategy to target disorder, illegal gun carrying, and crime (with stop-and-frisk 
as a central feature), the city witnessed a large, prolonged drop in crime. From 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, street crime in New York City declined approx-
imately 75%—a decrease roughly twice the national average.132 In 2007, there 
were 496 homicides in New York, down from more than 2,200 in 1990.133 
Proponents of stop-and-frisk point to New York City’s crime decline over 
the last two decades as evidence that the tactic is effective. For example, former 
NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly touted stop-and-frisk at a news confer-
ence by saying: 
Police stops are just one component of multiple efforts by the Department that 
have saved lives and driven the murder rate to record lows. In the first 11 years 
of Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure there were 7,363 fewer murders in New York City 
compared to the 11 years prior to the Mayor taking office.134 
Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg similarly praised the effec-
tiveness of stop-and-frisk in combatting crime, stating: “New York is the safest 
big city in the nation, and our crime reductions have been steeper than any other 
big city’s. For instance, if New York City had the murder rate of Washington, 
D.C., 761 more New Yorkers would have been killed last year.”135 
Whether stop-and-frisk caused or contributed to the crime decline in New 
York City is a hotly contested proposition.136 Several studies have suggested a 
causal connection. Corman and Mocan reported that misdemeanor arrests were 
associated with declines in robbery, motor vehicle theft, and grand larceny, but 
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ory.html [https://perma.cc/5QVY-3FZ7]. 
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not homicide, assault, burglary, and rape.137 Similarly, Kelling and Sousa found 
that misdemeanor arrest levels were significantly associated with reductions in 
violent crime, while controlling for several relevant community factors.138 Smith 
and Purtell found that Operation Impact had a significant effect on crimes-
against-persons in Impact Zones.139 Smith and Purtell also examined the effects 
of stop-and-frisk on crime in New York, and they found that there was a signif-
icant inverse relationship between stop rates and robbery, burglary, motor vehi-
cle theft, and homicides rates.140 Zimring argued that New York’s crime decline 
from 1990 through 2009 was largely attributable to the NYPD’s policing prac-
tices.141 
Conversely, there are a number of studies indicating that the relationship 
between stop-and-frisk and the crime decline in New York City is modest at 
best.142 For instance, Rosenfeld and Fornango found that police stops did not 
decrease robbery and burglary rates.143 In a re-analysis of Kelling and Sousa’s 
data, Harcourt and Ludwig found no significant relationships between policing 
minor disorder offenses and New York City’s crime decline.144 MacDonald and 
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colleagues conducted a comprehensive examination of the crime effects of Op-
eration Impact (with a specific focus on stop-and-frisk). They concluded: 
Impact zones were significantly associated with reductions in total reported 
crimes, assaults, burglaries, drug violations, misdemeanor crimes, felony property 
crimes, robberies, and felony violent crimes. Impact zones were significantly as-
sociated with increases in total reported arrests, arrests for burglary, arrests for 
weapons, arrests for misdemeanor crimes, and arrests for property felony crimes. 
Impact zones were also significantly associated with increases in investigative 
stops for suspected crimes, but only the increase in stops made based on probable 
cause indicators of criminal behaviors were associated with crime reductions. The 
largest increase in investigative stops in impact zones was based on indicators of 
suspicious behavior that had no measurable effect on crime. The findings suggest 
that saturating high crime blocks with police helped reduce crime in New York 
City, but that the bulk of the investigative stops did not play an important role in 
the crime reductions. The findings indicate that crime reduction can be achieved 
with more focused investigative stops.145 
C. The Social Costs 
Regardless of the impact on crime, there is considerable evidence demon-
strating that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program exacted significant social costs 
that were disproportionately experienced by racial and ethnic minorities.146 By 
the end of the 1990s, stop-and-frisk had become a point of contention among 
racial and ethnic minorities. A Vera Institute of Justice study examined the ex-
periences of more than 500 people who had been stopped by the NYPD: 
•  44% of young people surveyed indicated they had been stopped repeatedly—
nine times or more. 
•  Less than a third—29%—reported ever being informed of the reason for a stop. 
•  71% of young people surveyed reported being frisked at least once, and 64% 
said they had been searched. 
•  45% reported encountering an officer who threatened them, and 46% said they 
had experienced physical force at the hands of an officer. 
•  One out of four said they were involved in a stop in which the officer displayed 
his or her weapon. 
•  61% stated that the way police acted towards them was influenced by their age. 
•  51% indicated that they were treated worse than others because of their race 
and/or ethnicity.147 
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A study by Fagan and colleagues on stop-and-frisk in New York City iden-
tified three noteworthy findings: 
First, stops within neighborhoods take place at rates in excess of what would be 
predicted from the separate and combined effects of population demography, 
physical and social conditions, and the crime rate. This excess seems to be con-
centrated in predominately Black neighborhoods. Second, the excess stops in 
these neighborhoods persist over time, even as the Black population declines, 
crime rates remain low and effectively unchanged, the City’s overall social and 
economic health improves, and housing and other investments increase across the 
City’s neighborhoods, including its poorest and most segregated neighborhoods. 
Third, there appears to be a declining return in crime detection from marginal 
increases in enforcement, and this efficiency gap seems to grow over time.148 
Living in geographical areas of New York City where SQF was aggressively 
implemented appears to have negatively affected the mental health of the men 
subjected to such aggressive and racialized surveillance. A study by sociologists 
and public health scholars found that between 2009 and 2011, neighborhood-
level frisk and use-of-force proportions were linked to higher levels of psycho-
logical distress among men in high SQF neighborhoods, including feelings of 
nervousness and worthlessness.149 
The racial focus of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program was acknowledged 
(and minimized) by city and police department leaders.150 Former Mayor Mi-
chael Bloomberg stated publicly that, according to the department’s statistics on 
violent crime suspects, “we disproportionately stop whites too much and minor-
ities too little.”151 In 2013, an officer in the 40th precinct recorded his command-
ing officer directing him to stop “the right people, at the right time, at the right 
location,” described as “male [B]lacks, 14 to 20, 21.”152 The Center for Consti-
tutional Rights (CCR) interviewed fifty-four people who had been subjected to 
stop-and-frisk in order to paint a clearer picture of the “human impact” of the 
stop-and-frisk program.153 The CCR concluded: 
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These interviews provide evidence of how deeply this practice impacts individu-
als and they document widespread civil and human rights abuses . . . . The effects 
of these abuses can be devastating and often leave behind lasting emotional, psy-
chological, social, and economic harm. . . . Residents of some New York City 
neighborhoods describe a police presence so pervasive and hostile that they feel 
like they are living in a state of siege.154 
The overt, racially charged statements by city and police leaders, along with 
clear racial disproportionality in the administration of the stop-and-frisk pro-
gram, illustrates the persistent undercurrent of racial injustice in New York City 
policing and provides an important backdrop for the continued investigation of 
the NYPD’s SQF activities. 
D. Stop, Question, and Frisk in New York City Today 
The New York City experience with SQF since the Floyd ruling largely calls 
into question the crime decline argument. From 2011 to 2017, the number of 
stops conducted by NYPD officers declined by approximately 98%, but this dra-
matic reduction in stops did not lead to increased crime.155 In fact, New York’s 
decrease in the overall crime rate has continued. In 2016, New York reported a 
record low for homicides; the decrease continued such that in 2018, New York 
marked the lowest number of index crimes in nearly seventy years, including 
robberies, burglaries, motor vehicle larcenies, and murders.156 In 2019, the num-
ber of homicides rose by twenty-three killings, representing an 8% increase—a 
relatively small increase in terms of raw numbers for such a large city that “does 
not necessarily signal a new upward trend.”157 Moreover, other index crimes in 
New York City decreased by approximately 1% in 2019 from the prior year’s 
record lows.158 
As previously stated, the most recent SQF data from New York City indi-
cated that people of color were involved in nearly nine out of every ten stops by 
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the NYPD in 2019.159 The present study seeks to contextualize that figure by 
analyzing the racial, ethnic, and sex breakdown of stop-and-frisks during 2019 
in New York within the context of other situational factors. 
IV. METHODS 
A. Sources of Data 
The present study relied on three data sources: NYPD stop-and-frisk data, 
U.S. Census Bureau (2010) data, and official crime statistics from New York 
City. The stop-and-frisk data for the current study are drawn from the NYPD’s 
official SQF dataset that the NYPD updates annually and makes publicly avail-
able online.160 We used data from 2019 because that is the most current year for 
which data are available to investigate the independent and joint effects of race, 
ethnicity, and sex on key outcomes of interest, namely which persons are 
stopped, frisked, and subjected to force. 
The entirety of the SQF dataset is comprised of information from each indi-
vidual stop NYPD officers make and document on an official form, known as 
the UF-250 form.161 Officers are required to complete a UF-250 form if they use 
force, if the person stopped refuses to identify himself or herself, or if the indi-
vidual stopped is frisked, searched, and/or arrested.162 Prior to 2015, UF-250 
forms primarily gathered the following data, often reporting it simply by officers 
checking off applicable boxes: 
• The suspect’s sex, race, age, height, weight, hair color, eye color, and 
other features such as scars and tattoos. 
• The location of the stop, including address number, street name, inter-
section, city, state, zip code, police beat, police section, and police bor-
ough, along with the longitudinal (X) and latitudinal (Y) coordinates. 
• The reason or reasons that led up to the stop, frisk, and/or search. 
• The reason for police use of force and the type of force employed. 
• Whether the suspect was frisked, searched, and/or arrested. 
• Whether contraband or a weapon was found on the suspect.163 
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The form was updated in 2015 “to include a narrative section where an of-
ficer must record, in his or her own words, the basis for the stop.”164 The new 
form also contains a separate section for officers to explain why they conducted 
a frisk.165 Although the new form is not publicly available,166 Table 1 provides a 
description of the suspect- and encounter-level variables contained in the 
NYPD’s 2019 SQF dataset used in the present study. 
Additionally, macro- or community-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
and New York City were combined with the encounter-level data to account for 
citywide geographic variation in demographic characteristics and crime rates.167 
The U.S. Census Bureau data were aggregated to the precinct level using appor-
tionment in order to create the precinct-level variables for percent Black, percent 
Hispanic, residential instability, and concentrated disadvantage.168 Finally, the 
precinct-level crime data on felonies and misdemeanors were made available 
online through New York City.169 The descriptions of all precinct-level variables 
can be found in Table 1. 
B. Independent Variables 
The primary independent variables in this study are the race, ethnicity, and 
sex of the suspect as recorded on the NYPD’s official stop forms. Although those 
forms contain more options, race and ethnicity were coded as Black, Hispanic, 
or White, with White as the reference group.170 As Table 2 shows, the final sam-
ple was 61% Black, 30% Hispanic, and 9% White, mirroring the percentages 
reported by the New York Civil Liberties Union.171 The NYPD reports the sex 
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tified as belonging to these groups for meaningful statistical analyses. This, in turn, resulted 
in a 3% reduction in sample size. 
171  NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16. 
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of people stopped as either male or female. Consequently, we coded the variable 
dichotomously (0 = female, 1 = male). The final sample was 91% male.172 
 
172  We recognize that science has debated the notion of two sexes as being simplistic. Many 
biologists acknowledge “a more nuanced view of sex”—one that embraces “a wider spectrum” 
than the outdated fallacy of dimorphic sex fixed at birth. See Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined, 
518 NATURE 288, 288, 291 (2015). But the NYPD fails to capture data on transgender, inter-
sex, and nonbinary people. Accordingly, our variable measuring sex is dichotomous. 
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TABLE 1: VARIABLE NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION 
Dependent Variables  
Frisked Dichotomous variable indicating whether the suspect was 
frisked 
Searched Dichotomous variable indicating whether the suspect was 
searched 
Force Dummy variables were created for the types of force, in-
cluding no force, handcuff force, weapon force, and other 
force 
Independent Variables  
Male Dummy categories were created for male and female 
Race/Ethnicity  Dummy categories were created for White, Black, and His-
panic 
Control Variables  
Age Individual’s age in years 
Weight Individual’s weight measured in pounds 
Height Individual’s height measured in inches 
Multiple People 
Stopped 
Multiple people were stopped during the SQF 
Suspect Arrested Suspect was arrested at some point during police contact 
Engage in Violent 
Crime 
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a violent crime 
Known to Carry 
Weapon 
The suspect is known by police to carry a weapon 
Casing a Vic-
tim/Location 
Suspect cased a victim or location 
Concealed 
Weapon 
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a concealed 
weapon 
Drug Transaction Suspect engaged in actions indicative of a drug transaction 
Actions of Crimi-
nal Conduct 
Suspect engaged in actions indicative of criminal behavior  
Acting as Lookout Suspected acted as a lookout 
Proximity of 
Crime 
Suspect was in proximity to scene of offense 
Stop Initiation  Dummy variables indicating the source of the stop, includ-
ing officer initiation, dispatch initiation, or C/W on scene 
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Suspected Crime 
Description 
Dummy variables for suspected crime included petit lar-
ceny, grand larceny, robbery, assault, burglary, menacing, 
CPW, criminal trespass, grand larceny auto, other, criminal 
mischief, terrorism, possession of controlled substance, sale 
of marijuana, sale of controlled substance, CPSP, auto 
stripping, forcible touching, possession of marijuana, mur-
der, unauthorized use of vehicle, graffiti, reckless endan-
germent, prostitution, theft of services, and possession of 
forged instrument 
Percent Black The racial composition of each precinct for blacks 
Percent Hispanic The ethnic composition of each precinct for Hispanics 
Residential Insta-
bility 
Residential instability was an index measure that includes 
percent individuals residing in same house for one year, 
percent foreign born, and percent vacant houses.  
Concentrated Dis-
advantage 
Concentrated disadvantage was an index variable that in-
cludes percent female-headed households with dependents, 
percent persons in poverty, percent adult unemployment, 
and percent households receiving public assistance. 
Violent Crime 
Rate (logged) 
Reflects NYPD reported homicide, robbery, aggravated as-




Reflects NYPD reported misdemeanors per 100,000 resi-
dents, which includes possession of stolen property, sex 
crimes, dangerous drugs, dangerous weapons, petit larceny, 
assault, intoxicated/impaired driving, vehicle/traffic laws, 
criminal mischief, criminal trespass, unauthorized use of 
vehicle, offense against person, offense against public ad-
ministration, fraud, aggravated harassment, and other mis-
demeanors 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2019 (N =12,573)  
 
n Percent Mean 
Dependent Variables    
Frisked 7,213 57.40% ---- 





















Encounter-Level Variables    
Male 11,439 91.00% ---- 
White 1,101 9.00% ---- 
Black 7,712 61.00% ---- 
Hispanic 3,760 30.00% ---- 
Age ---- ---- 28.20 
Weight ---- ---- 167.10 
Height ---- ---- 67.70 
Multiple People Stopped 4,966 39.50% ---- 
Suspect Arrested 4,035 32.10% ---- 
Engaged in Violent Crime 3,760 30.00% ---- 
Known to Carry Weapon 440 3.50% ---- 
Casing a Victim/Location 503 4.00% ---- 
Concealed Weapon 2,074 16.50% ---- 
Drug Transaction 163 1.30% ---- 
Actions of Criminal Conduct 151 1.20% ---- 
Acting as Lookout 239 1.90% ---- 

















Suspected Crime Description ---- ---- ---- 
Precinct-Level Variables    
Percent Black ---- ---- 29.60 
Percent Hispanic ---- ---- 30.90 
Residential Instability ---- ---- -0.10 
Concentrated Disadvantage ---- ---- -0.10 
Violent Crime Rate (logged) ---- ---- 7.20 
Misdemeanor Crime Rate (logged) ---- ---- 8.20 
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C. Dependent Variables 
 For each NYPD stop reported in 2019, we analyzed the factors associated 
with whether the person stopped was subsequently subjected to either a frisk, a 
full search, or the application of force by police. The variable frisked was a di-
chotomous outcome in which the data were coded as 0 (not frisked) or 1 
(frisked). Similarly, the variable searched was a dichotomous outcome in which 
the data were coded as 0 (not searched) or 1 (searched). As Tables 2 and 3 reveal, 
police frisked 57.4% of the individuals they stopped, whereas they searched 
37.5% of the people stopped. The NYPD dataset has several categories for use 
of force, which includes pointing firearm, handcuffing suspect, using oleoresin 
capsicum (OC) spray, restraining suspect, verbally instructing suspect, using an 
impact weapon, and a final category entitled other. In 2019, the NYPD did not 
report any use of force incidents involving OC spray or restraint. Conversely, 
there were five cases involving an impact weapon and 532 incidents where a 
police officer pointed their firearm. Handcuff force was reported in 2,251 cases, 
and officers used verbal force in 11,601 encounters. For the analysis, use of force 
was limited to physical force. Due to the small sample size associated with im-
pact weapons, a new variable entitled weapon force was created that combined 
impact weapon with officers that pointed their weapon. The final variables for 
use of force included no force (75.10%), handcuff force (17.90%), weapon force 
(4.30%), and other force (2.70%). 
D. Control Variables 
 The control variables fall into two different categories: encounter-level and 
precinct-level variables. The encounter-level variables can be further delineated 
between suspects’ physical characteristics and circumstantial characteristics. 
1. Physical Characteristics 
The control variables for suspects’ physical characteristics include age, 
weight, and height. Age is a continuous variable with a mean of 28.2 years old 
and a range from 5 to 83 years old. Weight is a continuous variable with a mean 
of 167.1 pounds and a range from 60 to 400 pounds. Height is a continuous var-
iable with a mean of 67.7 inches (nearly 5 feet, 8 inches) and a range from 48 
inches (4 feet) to 96 inches (8 feet). 
2. Circumstantial Characteristics of the Encounter 
 The circumstantial characteristics of the SQF encounter are documented by 
NYPD officers in the UF-250 forms. Importantly, the circumstantial character-
istics are pieces of information that are garnered by officers both prior to and 
during a stop. As such, these control variables provide important encounter-level 
details that may help explain why a suspect was subjected to a frisk, search, or 
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force, which helps ensure that the analysis does not suffer from model misspec-
ification. 
A total of twelve variables were included in the analysis to account for cir-
cumstantial characteristics: multiple people stopped, suspect arrested,173 en-
gaged in violent crime, known to carry weapon, casing a victim/location, con-
cealed weapon, drug transaction, actions of criminal conduct, acting as a 
lookout, proximity of crime, stop initiation, and suspected crime description. A 
description of all circumstantial characteristics can be found in Table 1, with 
their corresponding descriptive statistics found in Table 2. 
3. Precinct Characteristics 
 These control variables capture ecological variation at the precinct level, 
which included percent Black, percent Hispanic, residential instability, concen-
trated disadvantage, violent crime rate, and misdemeanor crime rate. The per-
centages of precinct residents who are Black or Hispanic were calculated using 
U.S. Census Bureau data. Percent Black and percent Hispanic ranged from 
0.75% to 88.24% and 6.03% to 74.29%, respectively. These variables were in-
cluded in the analysis because prior research has found that percent Black and 
percent Hispanic are sometimes associated with heightened levels of formal so-
cial control (i.e., more policing) because they are perceived as being a threaten-
ing population.174 
Residential instability and concentrated disadvantage were also created us-
ing data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable residential instability cap-
tures the social disruptions within a precinct that may attenuate the formation of 
social ties that combat crime.175 The variable concentrated disadvantage 
measures the level of economic deprivation within a precinct.176 Both residential 
instability and concentrated disadvantage variables rely on principal component 
analysis (“PCA”) to extract summary components. “PCA analyzes a data table 
representing observations described by several dependent variables, which are, 
 
173  The variable suspect arrested was included in the analysis for the models examining the 
outcome search. If someone is arrested, it is NYPD policy that the arrested individual is 
searched. See NYPD, PATROL GUIDE: ARRESTS – GENERAL SEARCH GUIDELINES, PROC. NO. 
208-05 (2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/pg208-
05-strip-search.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKH5-2AGD]. By accounting for the variable suspect 
arrested, the analysis more accurately reports findings on individuals who were searched in 
the process of the stop-and-frisk tactic. 
174  See, e.g., Brad W. Smith & Malcolm D. Holmes, Police Use of Excessive Force in Minority 
Communities: A Test of the Minority Threat, Place, and Community Accountability Hypothe-
ses, 61 SOC. PROBS. 83, 85 (2014). 
175  Lyndsay N. Boggess & John R. Hipp, Violent Crime, Residential Instability and Mobility: 
Does the Relationship Differ in Minority Neighborhoods?, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
351, 352 (2010). 
176  Alyssa W. Chamberlain & John R. Hipp, It’s All Relative: Concentrated Disadvantage 
Within and Across Neighborhoods and Communities, and the Consequences for Neighbor-
hood Crime, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 431, 431 (2015). 
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in general inter-correlated. Its goal is to extract the important information from 
the data table and to express this information as a set of new orthogonal variables 
called principal components.”177 In lay terms, PCA transforms highly related in-
dicators into a single variable (i.e., the component) that best summarizes the data 
from all indicators. We created the residential instability variable, for instance, 
using three indicators: the percentage of people in the precinct who were born 
outside of the United States, the percentage of vacant homes, and the percentage 
of individuals residing in the same home for at least one year (with lower values 
indicating greater instability). Similarly, we created the concentrated disad-
vantage variable using four indicators: percent female-headed households with 
dependents, percent persons in poverty, percent adult unemployment, and per-
cent households receiving public assistance. All the indicators for residential in-
stability and concentrated disadvantage had factor loadings above 0.68, which 
suggests the indicators are adequately related to one another and the concepts of 
interest. 
Lastly, the NYPD’s raw data on the number of felony and misdemeanor of-
fenses in each precinct were standardized per 100,000 citizens. These variables 
were log transformed178 to reduce their skewed nature and meet the assumptions 
of inferential statistics.179 The crime types captured by these variables are re-
ported in Table 1, with their corresponding descriptive statistics in Table 2. 
E. Analytic Strategy 
Examining the independent and joint effects of race, ethnicity, and gender 
on the outcomes of interest proceeded in three stages. First, the descriptive sta-
tistics and cross tabulations were reviewed to better understand which social 
groups were subjected to frisks, searches, and force by the NYPD. Second, in-
ferential statistics were employed to analyze the independent and joint effects of 
race, ethnicity, and gender on the likelihood of being frisked and searched by the 
NYPD. Finally, the relationship between race, ethnicity, sex, and the different 
 
177  Hervé Abdi & Lynne J. Williams, Principal Component Analysis, 2 WIRES 
COMPUTATIONAL STAT. 433, 433 (2010). 
178  The log transformation is a common method in biomedical and psychosocial research to 
deal with skewed data—that is, data that are not normally distributed and, therefore, violate 
the assumptions of many statistical tests. To address the problem, log transformations use 
algebra to normalize the data as much as possible, thereby increasing the validity of the asso-
ciated statistical analyses. See, e.g., Jason W. Osborne, Improving Your Data Transfor-
mations: Applying the Box-Cox Transformation, 15 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION 
1, 2–3 (2010). 
179  Jason W. Osborne & Elaine Waters, Four Assumptions of Multiple Regression That Re-
searchers Should Always Test, 8 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION 1, 1 (2002); Matt 
N. Williams, Carlos A. Gómez Grajales & Dason Kurkiewicz, Assumptions of Multiple Re-
gression: Correcting Two Misconceptions, 18 PRAC. ASSESSMENT, RSCH. & EVALUATION 1, 
2–3 (2013). 
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categories for police use of force were examined using Pearson’s Chi-Square 
tests.180 
Statistically speaking, the main-effect models focus on the independent ef-
fects of race, ethnicity, and gender, whereas the joint-effect models focus on the 
interactive effects (or intersectionality) of the aforementioned demographic var-
iables. More simply, the main-effect models examine whether the NYPD frisks 
or searches of males differ significantly from those of females and whether there 
are significant disparities that existed between White, Black, and Hispanic indi-
viduals in terms of frisks and searches. The joint-effect models provide added 
nuance to the analyses by examining how different combinations of sex, race, 
and ethnicity compare to each other. Such analysis, for example, allows for 
White males to be compared to Hispanic females in the context of SQF encoun-
ters. 
To examine the main and joint effects of race, ethnicity, and gender on the 
likelihood of being frisked and searched by the NYPD, multilevel logistic re-
gression was selected as the appropriate analysis. Logistic regression is typically 
used when the dependent variable is dichotomous—in other words, there are 
only two possible outcomes, such as not being frisked (coded 0) or being frisked 
(coded 1). Additionally, we combined logistic regression with a multilevel mod-
eling strategy because many SQFs occurred within the same precinct, meaning 
the data were nested within 77 NYPD precincts181 and could, therefore, violate 
the statistical assumption of independence.182 Because multi-level logistic re-
gression technique corrects for this, it is the appropriate tool for analyzing NYPD 
SQF data as coded in this study.183 
The examination of police use of force relies on bivariate analyses to deter-
mine whether significant differences existed between race/ethnicity, sex, and the 
four categorical variables for force. Specifically, we use the Pearson’s Chi-
Square test to analyze if there are any statistically significant differences between 
categorical variables, and we also report Cramer’s V statistics to assess the 
 
180  Using Chi-Square Statistic in Research, STAT. SOLS., https://www.statisticssolutions.com/ 
using-chi-square-statistic-in-research/ [https://perma.cc/9Q3Q-8WEK]. 
181  In line with previous studies conducted by a variety of respected researchers, data from 
Central Park (Precinct 22) was not included in the analysis because it is nonresidential. See 
Cerdá, Messner, Tracy, Vlahov, Goldmann, Tardiff & Galea, supra note 142, at 1108; Preeti 
Chauhan, Magdalena Cerdá, Steven F. Messner, Melissa Tracy, Kenneth Tardiff & Sandro 
Galea, Race/Ethnic-Specific Homicide Rates in New York City: Evaluating the Impact of Bro-
ken Windows Policing and Crack Cocaine Markets, 15 HOMICIDE STUD. 268, 272 (2011); 
Ferrandino, supra note 12, at 210; Levchak, supra note 12, at 378; Steven F. Messner, Sandro 
Galea, Kenneth J. Tardiff, Melissa Tracy, Angela Bucciarelli, Tina Markham Piper, Victoria 
Frye & David Vlahov, Policing, Drugs, and the Homicide Decline in New York City in the 
1990s, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 385, 391 (2007). 
182  See sources cited supra notes 178–179. 
183  See STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS: 
APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS xx (2d ed. 2002). 
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strength of any association.184 Chi-square tests were used to analyze use of force 
instead of regression-based techniques because there were so few use-of-force 
incidents. For example, there were only seven Hispanic females who had weapon 
force used on them during an SQF. Because the counts for use-of-force incidents 
were so low, especially for certain social groups, it is difficult for meaningful 
comparisons to be made using regression-based analysis. 
F. Data Limitations 
 There are several limitations associated with the datasets used for analysis. 
First and foremost, this study uses NYPD administrative data that several critics 
have suggested are incomplete and inaccurate. In fact, there are indications that 
a substantial proportion of stops occur without formal documentation. Consider 
that Jones-Brown and colleagues reported in 2013 that although one study esti-
mated that approximately 70% of all stops were captured on UF-250 forms, an 
NYPD commander estimated that “only 1 in 10 stops” was documented by of-
ficers on the UF-250.185 With the new form requiring officers to complete narra-
tive explanations to justify SQF activities, there are even more reasons to ques-
tion the completeness of the NYPD’s data. “The monitor overseeing police stops 
has repeatedly cited underreporting as a serious problem.”186 And because the 
NYPD employs approximately 22,000 police officers and sergeants (the ranks 
of those who are likely to make stops), the fact that only 13,500 were reported in 
2019 seems—in the words of the legal director of the New York Civil Liberties 
Union—“suspiciously low.”187 As a result, the data may only provide a conserva-
tive estimate and may not be representative of the individuals that are actually 
stopped by the NYPD. Nonetheless, they are the best available data for analyzing 
the present study’s research questions. 
There are also limitations associated with how the data were apportioned 
and aggregated to the precinct level. The sizes of precincts may be such large 
units of analysis that it does not account for community-level variation at smaller 
units of analysis like census blocks or census tracts.188 Given the heterogenous 
nature of New York City, it is possible that the aggregation of precinct-level 
characteristics may over- or under-represent the racial or ethnic composition of 
neighborhoods, as well as associated variables such as residential instability, 
concentrated disadvantage, and the number of felonies and misdemeanors re-
ported. 
 
184  RONET D. BACHMAN & RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, STATISTICS FOR CRIMINOLOGY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 634, 637 (4th ed. 2017). 
185  JONES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 120, at 3; see also Weisburd et al., supra note 118, at 
148; Rosenfeld & Fornango, supra note 143, at 98. 
186  Khan, supra note 15. 
187  Id. 
188  Jerry H. Ratcliffe & Michael J. McCullagh, Hotbeds of Crime and the Search for Spatial 
Accuracy, 1 J. GEOGRAPHICAL SYS. 385, 395–96 (1999). 
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Finally, it is challenging to estimate on-street population in New York City. 
Due to tourism, commuting, and other factors, daily foot traffic may vary from 
the precinct-level variables that account for percent Black and percent Hispanic. 
Note, however, that smaller geographic units of analysis would not necessarily 
be more accurate:  
[T]his cannot be resolved by analyzing post-stop outcomes at a different unit of 
analysis (i.e., census tracts or blocks). Using a smaller unit of analysis has the 
potential to make it less likely that the racial composition of the unit matches the 
racial composition of the on-street population. Given the smaller size of blocks, 
people will be more likely to pass between Census blocks than between pre-
cincts.189 
Recognizing these limitations, we follow what previous researchers have 
done by aggregating U.S. Census Bureau data to the precinct level, thereby main-
taining congruency between the NYPD dataset and the macro-level variables in 
this study.190 
V. RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
In 2019, the NYPD recorded a total of 13,459 stops.191 Due to missing data 
and listwise deletion, the total sample size for this study was 12,573, which rep-
resents a 6.6% reduction in sample size from the original NYPD dataset; it did 
not significantly impact the demographic characteristics of the study.192  
The NYPD officially reported 7,213 frisks and 4,655 searches during 2019, 
totaling 11,868 documented instances of NYPD officers putting hands on a citi-
zen to look for contraband.193 These encounters yielded a total of 1,177 weapons, 
meaning that weapons were recovered in 9.9% of hands-on events.194  
 
189  Levchak, supra note 12, at 386. 
190  Ferrandino, supra note 12, at 218; Joseph A. Ferrandino, The Effectiveness and Equity of 
NYPD Stop and Frisk Policy, 2003–2014, 41 J. CRIME & JUST. 119, 124–25 (2018); Levchak, 
supra note 12, at 378; Morrow, White & Fradella, supra note 12, at 375. This approach has 
the added benefit of offering insights at a level useful to police because precincts “organize, 
constrain, and define an officer’s understanding” of the work environment. Weston J. Morrow, 
Emily R. Berthelot & Samuel G. Vickovic, Police Use of Force: An Examination of the Mi-
nority Threat Perspective, 31 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 368, 375 (2018). 
191  NYCLU, SQF Data, supra note 16. 
192  To compare and contrast our data with the original dataset, see id. and NYPD, SQF Data, 
supra note 160. 
193  NYPD, SQF Data, supra note 160. 
194  Unfortunately, the NYPD’s dataset does not specify whether these weapons were discov-
ered during a frisk or a more comprehensive search, so we report the overall “hit” rate for 
weapons for hands-on events to investigate whether a suspect is armed. 
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1. Race and Ethnicity 
The descriptive statistics presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 reveal several 
trends among officers stopping, frisking, searching, and using force on New 
Yorkers. As Table 2 illustrates, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites accounted for 
61%, 30%, and 9% of individuals stopped by the police, respectively. Thus, a 
whopping 91% of the individuals NYPD stopped were either Black or Hispanic. 
And as Tables 3 and 4 indicate, Blacks and Hispanics were frisked and searched 
more often by the NYPD than their White counterparts. Of the individuals 
stopped, Black and Hispanic people were frisked 36% and 18% of the time in 
comparison to 4% for White people. Additionally, Blacks and Hispanics were 
searched in 22% and 12% of incidents, respectively, whereas White individuals 
were searched in only 3.5% of SQF encounters. Table 5 reveals that the NYPD 
used force more often against Black and Hispanic individuals than Whites. Spe-
cifically, Blacks and Hispanics were subjected to weapons-level force in 2.75% 
and 1.10% of SQF encounters compared to only 0.45% of the time for Whites. 
Put differently, Black and Hispanic New Yorkers were approximately 6.1 and 
2.4 times more likely, respectively, to have weapon force used against them than 
Whites. And, as Table 5 illustrates, similar racial and ethnic differences exist for 
the other force categories. 




TABLE 3: FRISKS BY RACE AND GENDER 
Outcome 
Black Hispanic White 
Total 




Male Female Total Whites 
Frisked 
n 4,301 205 4,506 2,129 91 2,220 443 44 487 7,213 
% of all 
stops 
(34.2%) (1.6%) (35.8%) (16.9%) (0.7%) (17.7%) (3.5%) (0.3%) (3.9%) (57.4%) 
Not 
Frisked 
n 2,718 488 3,206 1,346 194 1,540 502 112 614 5,360 
% of all 
stops 
(21.6%) (3.9%) (25.5%) (10.7%) (1.5%) (12.2%) (4.0%) (0.9%) (4.9%) (42.6%) 
Subtotals 
n 7,019 693 7,712 3,475 285 3,760 945 156 1,101 12,573 










(7.52%) (1.24%) (8.76%) (100.0%) 
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TABLE 4: SEARCHES BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER 
Outcome 
Black Hispanic White 
Total 




Male Female Total Whites 
Searched 
n 2,552 206 2,758 1,379 90 1,469 379 49 428 4,655 
% of all 
stops 
(20.3%) (1.6%) (21.9%) (11.0%) (0.7%) (11.7%) (3.0%) (0.4%) (3.4%) (37.0%) 
Not 
Searched 
n 4,467 487 4,954 2,096 195 2,291 566 107 673 7,918 
% of all 
stops 
(35.5%) (3.9%) (39.4%) (16.7%) (1.6%) (18.2%) (4.5%) (0.9%) (5.4%) (63.0%) 
Subtotals 
n 7,019 693 7,712 3,475 285 3,760 945 156 1,101 12,573 










(7.52%) (1.24%) (8.76%) (100.0%) 
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TABLE 5: POLICE USES OF FORCE DURING SQFS BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER 
Outcome 
Black Hispanic White 
Total 




Male Female Total Whites 
Weapons 
Force 
n 329 19 348 129 7 136 47 6 53 537 
% of all 
stops 
(2.62%) (0.15%) (2.77%) (1.03%) (0.06%) (1.08%) (0.37%) (0.05%) 0.42% 4.27% 
Handcuff 
Force 
n 1,322 116 1,438 599 46 645 146 22 168 2,251 






(4.76)% (0.37%) (5.13%) (1.16%) (0.17%) (1.34)% (17.90%) 
Other 
Force 
n 187 21 208 86 6 92 34 4 38 338 
% of all 
stops 
(1.49%) (0.17%) (1.65%) (0.68%) (0.05%) (0.73%) (0.27%) (0.03)% (0.30%) (2.26%) 
All Uses 
of Force 
n 1,838 156 1,994 814 59 873 227 32 259 3,126 






(6.47%) (0.47%) (6.94%) (1.81%) (0.25%) (2.06%) (24.86)% 
No Force 
n 5,181 537 5,718 2,661 226 2,887 718 124 842 9,447 










(5.71%) (0.99%) (6.70%) (75.14%) 
Subtotals 
n 7,019 693 7,712 3,475 285 3,760 945 156 1,101 12,573 










(7.52%) (1.24%) (8.76%) (100.0%) 
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2. Sex 
Ninety-one percent of SQFs involved male suspects; females were involved 
in only 9% of stops. Similarly, dramatic differences on the basis of sex manifest 
in frisks, searches, and force. Males were frisked in 55% and searched in 34% of 
the incidents, whereas females were frisked in only 2.7% and searched in 2.73% 
of SQFs. Regarding force, males had handcuff force, weapon force, and other 
force used against them 16.50%, 4.00%, and 2.50% of the time, respectively. 
Females had handcuff force, weapon force, and other force used against them 
1.50%, 0.25%, and 0.25% of the time, respectively. 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 reveal data that explain how the intersection of sex with 
race and ethnicity affect frisk, search, and force outcomes during SQFs. The re-
sults highlight how examining race and ethnicity independently from sex can 
skew the outcomes for certain groups of people. Specifically, Black and Hispanic 
males were frisked in 34% and 17% of SQFs, whereas White males, White fe-
males, Black females, and Hispanic females were frisked in 3.42%, 0.35%, 
1.36%, and 0.72% of SQFs, respectively. Likewise, Black and Hispanic males 
were searched far more often than the others—20% and 11%, respectively. In 
comparison, White males, White females, Black females, and Hispanic females 
were searched in 3%, 0.39%, 1.64%, and 0.71% of SQFs, respectively. 
The results in Table 5 also reveal that Black and Hispanic males were most 
often subjected to force in comparison to the other social groups. NYPD officers 
used handcuff force against Black and Hispanic males 10.55% and 4.73% of the 
time, respectively; weapon force 2.62% and 1.03% of the time, respectively; and 
other force 1.49% and 0.68% of the time, respectively. All other social groups 
were far less likely to have force used against them. White males, for example, 
experienced handcuff force 1.15% of the time and weapon force 0.37% of the 
time, which means Black males were approximately 9.17 and 7.08 times more 
likely to have handcuff force and weapon force used against them in comparison 
to their White counterparts. 
B. Inferential Statistics 
1. Main Effect Models 
The multilevel logistic regression presented in Table 6 reveals that there 
were a number of encounter-level variables that influenced the odds of being 
frisked and searched by the NYPD. In the model examining the odds of being 
frisked (Table 6, Model 1), the only significant suspect characteristics were sex 
and age. As Model 1 indicates, the odds of being frisked were 2.67 times greater 
for males than females. For age, there was a significant curvilinear relationship, 
meaning that as individuals get older, they were less likely to be frisked by the 
police. It is important to note that none of the variables for race and ethnicity 
were significant in the main-effect models. 
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TABLE 6: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT—MAIN EFFECT MODELS 









Suspect Variables     
Gender 2.67*** 0.29 1.74*** 0.16 
Whitea --- --- --- --- 
Black 1.02 0.11 0.93 0.09 
Hispanic 1.15 0.13 1.06 0.10 
Age 1.03* 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Ageb 0.99* 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Weight 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Height 1.03 0.08 1.09 0.07 
Encounter-Level Variables     
Multiple People Stopped 1.07 0.07 0.77*** 0.04 
Suspect Arrested --- --- 17.53*** 0.97 
Engaged in Violent 
Crime 
198.78*** 28.58 1.62*** 0.10 
Known to Carry Weapon 60.26*** 28.05 1.13 0.14 
Casing a Victim/Loca-
tion 
0.98 0.15 0.85 0.12 
Concealed Weapon 2.40*** 0.26 1.59*** 0.12 
Drug Transaction 1.75* 0.45 1.95** 0.49 
Actions of Criminal Con-
duct 
1.28 0.32 1.08 0.24 
Acting as Lookout 0.69 0.14 0.91 0.17 
Proximity of Crime 0.95 0.06 0.91 0.05 
Officer Initiationa --- --- --- --- 
Dispatch Initiation 0.81* 0.07 0.83* 0.06 
C/W on Scene 0.82 0.08 0.97 0.09 
Suspected Crime De-
scription 
--- --- --- --- 
Precinct-Level Variables     
Percent Black 1.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Percent Hispanic 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Residential Instability 1.07 0.08 1.11 0.07 
Concentrated Disad-
vantage 
1.25 0.15 0.94 0.09 
Violent Crime Rate 
(logged) 
1.21 0.39 0.64 0.17 
Misdemeanor Crime 
Rate (logged) 
0.86 0.27 1.63 0.44 
Constant 0.10 0.15 0.06* 0.08 
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Notes a Reference category 
b Each model controlled for the suspected crime de-
scriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are not 
reported because there are 26 different categories. 
*p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001 
 
 
The most robust predictors of being frisked were the circumstantial charac-
teristics of the encounter. Specifically, the odds of being frisked were 198.78 and 
60.26 times greater for individuals whom officers believed had engaged in vio-
lent crime or whom police knew were suspects who carried weapons. Addition-
ally, the odds of an officer frisking someone was 2.40 and 1.75 times greater, 
respectively, if the officer believed that the individual’s actions were indicative 
of a concealed weapon (as opposed to being actually known as a carrier of weap-
ons) or a drug transaction. Finally, the odds of being frisked were 0.81 times 
lower for individuals if the stop was initiated by dispatch instead of by the officer 
on the scene. 
The second main effect model (Table 6, Model 2) found that encounter-level 
variables influenced the odds of being searched. Similar to Model 1, none of the 
variables for race and ethnicity were significant in the model examining the odds 
of being searched. The only significant suspect characteristic was sex. The odds 
of being searched by the NYPD were 1.74 times greater for males than females. 
The findings for circumstantial characteristics reveal that being arrested sig-
nificantly increases the odds of being searched. Specifically, the odds of being 
searched were 17.43 times greater for individuals that were arrested by the po-
lice. This is not surprising given that the NYPD is trained to conduct a search 
upon arrest.195 Individuals also had higher odds of being searched if their actions 
were indicative of a violent crime (OR = 1.62),196 a concealed weapon (OR = 
 
195  See NYPD, PATROL GUIDE: ARRESTS – GENERAL PROCESSING, PROC. NO. 208-03 (2016), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/pg208-03-arrest-pro-
cessing-strip-search.pdf [https://perma.cc/X87H-2678]. 
196  “OR” is the standard abbreviation for odds-ratio, which “is a measure of association be-
tween an exposure and an outcome. The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur 
given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of 
that exposure.” Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 227, 227 (2010). 
Probability means the risk of an event happening divided by the total number of people at risk of 
having that event. I will use the example in a recent JAMA article. In a deck of 52 cards, there are 
13 spades. So, the risk (or probability) of drawing a card randomly from the deck and getting 
spades is 13/52 = 0.25 = 25%. The numerator is the number of spades, and the denominator is the 
total number of cards. 
Odds seems less intuitive. It is the ratio of the probability a thing will happen over the probability 
it won’t. In the spades example, the probability of drawing a spade is 0.25. The probability of not 
drawing a spade is 1–0.25. So the odds is 0.25/0.75 or 1:3 (or 0.33 or 1/3 pronounced 1 to 3 
odds) . . . 
Clay Smith, Idiot’s Guide to Odds Ratios, J. FEED (Dec. 8, 2018), https://journalfeed.org/arti-
cle-a-day/2018/idiots-guide-to-odds-ratios [https://perma.cc/PH3J-8PA3]. Put differently, and 
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1.59), or a drug transaction (OR = 1.95). Conversely, individuals had lower odds 
of being searched if multiple people were stopped (OR = 0.77) or the stop was 
initiated by police dispatchers via their police radios (OR = 0.83) in comparison 
to being initiated by the officer. 
2. Joint Effect Models 
The joint effects of gender and race on the outcomes were examined using 
six different categorical variables (White male, Black male, Hispanic male, 
White female, Black female, and Hispanic female). The models in Tables 7 and 
8 suggest that the findings from the main effect models (Table 6) distort the true 
impact of race, ethnicity, and sex on frisk and search outcomes. The models in 
Tables 7 and 8 were identical with the exception of the reference group for the 
gender-by-race/ethnicity categories. In Table 7, the reference group was White 
males, whereas the reference group was White females in Table 8. We varied the 
reference group in order to examine within-gender differences among the racial 
and ethnic categories in addition to between-gender differences. According to 
Model 3 (Table 7), the odds of being frisked were 1.26 times greater for Hispanic 
males in comparison to White males. Additionally, the odds of being frisked 
were 0.39 and 0.43 times lower for Black and Hispanic females, respectively, 
than White males. In Model 4 (Table 7), Black and Hispanic males did not have 
higher odds of being searched in comparison to White males. Similar to Model 
3, however, the odds of being searched were 0.59, 0.59, and 0.60 times lower for 
White, Black, and Hispanic females in comparison to White males. The findings 
from all of the other suspect and circumstantial characteristics were nearly iden-
tical to those reported in the main effect models. 
 
using the context of the present study, “[o]dds ratios are used to compare the relative odds of 
the occurrence of the outcome of interest” (e.g. whether a suspect is stopped, frisked, searched, 
or subjected to the use of force by police) “given exposure to the variable of interest” (e.g., 
race/ethnicity or sex). Szumilas, supra, at 227. 
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TABLE 7: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT— 
JOINT EFFECT MODELS WITH WHITE MEN AS REFERENCE GROUP 









Suspect Variables     
White Malea --- --- --- --- 
Black Male 1.12 0.12 0.98 0.09 
Hispanic Male 1.26* 0.14 1.12 0.11 
White Female 0.63 0.17 0.59* 0.14 
Black Female 0.39*** 0.06 0.59*** 0.08 
Hispanic Female 0.43*** 0.10 0.60** 0.11 
Age 1.03* 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Ageb 0.99* 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Weight 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Height 1.02 0.08 1.09 0.07 
Encounter-Level Variables     
Multiple People Stopped 1.06 0.07 0.77*** 0.04 
Suspect Arrested --- --- 17.55*** 0.97 
Engaged in Violent Crime 201.87*** 29.05 1.63*** 0.10 
Known to Carry Weapon 60.58*** 28.20 1.13 0.14 
Casing a Victim/Location 0.98 0.15 0.84 0.11 
Concealed Weapon 2.42*** 0.26 1.60*** 0.12 
Drug Transaction 1.69 0.43 1.92** 0.48 
Actions of Criminal Con-
duct 
1.24 0.31 1.05 0.23 
Acting as Lookout 0.69 0.14 0.92 0.17 
Proximity of Crime 0.95 0.06 0.91 0.05 
Officer Initiationa --- --- --- --- 
Dispatch Initiation 0.80** 0.07 0.83** 0.06 
C/W on Scene 0.82 0.08 0.97 0.09 
Suspected Crime Descrip-
tionb 
--- --- --- --- 
Precinct-Level Variables     
Percent Black 1.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Percent Hispanic 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Residential Instability 1.07 0.08 1.11 0.07 
Concentrated Disad-
vantage 
1.25 0.15 0.94 0.09 
Violent Crime Rate 
(logged) 
1.19 0.38 0.64 0.17 
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Misdemeanor Crime Rate 
(logged) 
0.87 0.28 1.60 0.43 
Constant 0.26 0.39 0.11 0.14 
Notes a Reference category 
b Each model controlled for the suspected crime 
descriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are 
not reported because there are 26 different catego-
ries. 
*p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001 
 
 
The output reported in Table 8 used White females as the reference group 
for the gender-by-race/ethnicity comparisons. Model 5 indicates that the odds of 
Black females being frisked were 0.61 times lower than White females. Addi-
tionally, the odds of being frisked were 1.61, 1.75, and 1.98 times greater for 
White, Black, and Hispanic males, respectively, than White females. In the 
model examining the odds of being searched (Model 6), there were no significant 
within-gender differences among females. Akin to Model 5, however, the odds 
of being searched were 1.88, 1.74, and 1.99 times higher for White, Black, and 
Hispanic males in comparison to White females. The findings from the remain-
ing suspect and circumstantial characteristics are almost identical to those re-
ported in the main effect models. 
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TABLE 8: MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT—JOINT EFFECT MODELS WITH 
WHITE FEMALES AS REFERENCE GROUP 
 









Suspect Variable     
White Male 1.61* 0.38 1.88** 0.40 
Black Male 1.75* 0.38 1.74** 0.34 
Hispanic Male 1.98** 0.44 1.99*** 0.39 
White Femalea --- --- --- --- 
Black Female 0.61* 0.15 1.04 0.23 
Hispanic Female 0.68 0.20 1.06 0.27 
Age 1.03* 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Ageb 0.99* 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Weight 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Height 1.02 0.08 1.09 0.07 
Encounter-Level Variables     
Multiple People Stopped 1.06 0.07 0.77*** 0.04 
Suspect Arrested --- --- 17.57*** 0.97 
Engaged in Violent Crime 201.96*** 29.06 1.63*** 0.10 
Known to Carry Weapon 60.50*** 28.17 1.14 0.14 
Casing a Victim/Location 0.98 0.15 0.84 0.11 
Concealed Weapon 2.42*** 0.26 1.60*** 0.12 
Drug Transaction 1.70* 0.43 1.93** 0.48 
Actions of Criminal Con-
duct 
1.25 0.31 1.06 0.23 
Acting as Lookout 0.69 0.14 0.92 0.17 
Proximity of Crime 0.95 0.06 0.91 0.05 
Officer Initiationa --- --- --- --- 
Dispatch Initiation 0.80** 0.07 0.83** 0.06 
C/W on Scene 0.83 0.08 0.97 0.09 
Suspected Crime Descrip-
tionb 
--- --- --- --- 
Precinct-Level Variables     
Percent Black 1.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Percent Hispanic 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Residential Instability 1.07 0.08 1.11 0.07 
Concentrated Disad-
vantage 
1.25 0.15 0.94 0.09 
Violent Crime Rate 
(logged) 
1.19 0.38 0.64 0.17 
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Misdemeanor Crime Rate 
(logged) 
0.87 0.28 1.61 0.43 
Constant 0.16 0.25 0.06* 0.08 
Notes a Reference category 
b Each model controlled for the suspected crime 
descriptions. For aesthetic appeal, the results are 
not reported because there are 26 different catego-
ries. 
*p<.05     **p<.01     ***p<.001 
 
3. Chi-Square Output 
The first series of Pearson’s Chi-Square analyses examined the independent 
associations between race, ethnicity, sex, and the different force outcomes. In 
Table 9, the Chi-Square statistics for race and ethnicity were significant for no 
force (χ
2
(2)=9.25; p <.05), handcuff force (χ
2
(2)=9.51; p <.01), and weapon force 
(χ
2
(2)=5.80; p <.05), but not other force. For sex, the Chi-Square results revealed 
that the only significant finding was related to weapon force (χ
2
(1)=5.90; p <.05). 
Even though there were some significant differences, it must be acknowledged 
that these differences were minor. White, Black, and Hispanic individuals, for 
example, had handcuff force used against them 15.3%, 18.6%, and 17.2% of the 
time, respectively. Similar minor differences were reported in weapon force for 
race and ethnicity and the association between sex and weapon force. Related to 
these findings, Cramer’s V was also reported to provide a strength of association, 
or measure of correlation, between the categorical variables. “[A] value of 
Cramer’s V within the range of .07–.21 indicates a small effect, a value within 
the range of .21–.35 indicates a medium effect, and a value larger than .35 indi-
cates a large effect.”197 Considering the Cramer’s V estimates were all close to 
zero, the effect between race/ethnicity, sex, and use of force were negligible, 
even though statistically significant. 
 
197  Shuyan Sun, Wei Pan & Lihshing Leigh Wang, A Comprehensive Review of Effect Size 
Reporting and Interpreting Practices in Academic Journals in Education and Psychology, 102 
J. EDUC. PSYCH. 989, 994 (2010); see also JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR 
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 216–17 (2d ed. 1988). 
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TABLE 9: MAIN EFFECT CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR USE OF FORCE 




Race/Ethnicity Differences    
No Force White 842 of 1,101 (76.5%) 
9.25(2)* 0.03 Black 5,718 of 7,712 (74.1%) 
Hispanic 2,887 of 3,760 (76.7%) 
Handcuff 
Force 
White  168 of 1,101(15.3%) 
9.51(2)** 0.03  Black 1,438 of 7,712 (18.6%) 
 Hispanic 645 of 3,760 (17.2%) 
Weapon 
Force 
White  53 of 1,101 (4.8%) 
5.80(2)* 0.02  Black 348 of 7,712 (4.5%) 
 Hispanic 136 of 3,760 (3.6%) 
Other Force White 38 of 1,101 (3.5%) 
3.28(2) 0.02  Black 208 of 7,712 (2.7%) 
 Hispanic 92 of 3,760 (2.5%) 
Sex Differences    
No Force Male 8,560 of 11,439 
(74.8%) 2.57(1) -0.01 
 Female 887 of 1,134 (78.2%) 
Handcuff 
Force 
Male 2,067 of 11,439 
(18.1%) 2.45(1) 0.01 
 Female 184 of 1,134 (16.2%) 
Weapon 
Force 
Male  505 of 11,439 (4.4%) 
5.90(1)* 0.02 
 Female 31 of 1,134 (2.7%) 
Other Force Male 307 of 11,439 (2.7%) 0.06(1) -0.00  Female 31 of 1,134 (2.7%) 
 
The second series of Chi-Square analyses focused of the joint relationship 
between race/ethnicity and sex with use of force. In Table 10, the Chi-Square 
statistics for race-ethnicity-sex combinations were significant for no force 
(χ
2
(5)=12.28; p <.05), handcuff force (χ
2
(5)=11.84; p <.05), weapon force 
(χ
2
(5)=13.10; p <.05), and other force (χ
2
(5)=4.30; p <.05). Similar to the results 
presented in Table 9, the differences, although statistically significant, were mi-
nor. White males, Black males, Hispanic males, White females, Black females, 
and Hispanic females, for instance, had weapon force used against them 5.0%, 
4.7%, 3.7%, 3.8%, 2.7%, and 2.5% of the time, respectively. Similar minor dif-
ferences were reported for no force, handcuff force, and other force. Even though 
these findings were significant, the Cramer’s V estimates for all use of force cat-
egories were close to zero, suggesting that these relationships were negligible.198 
 
198  Sun et al., supra note 197. 
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TABLE 10: JOINT CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR USE OF FORCE 
Force 
Outcome 






White Male 718 of 945 (75.9%) 
12.28(5)* 0.03 
Black Male 5,181 of 7,019 (73.8%) 
Hispanic Male 2,661 of 3,475 (76.6%) 
White Female 124 of 156 (79.5%) 
Black Female 537 of 693 (77.5%) 




White Male 146 of 945 (15.4%) 
11.84(5)* 0.03 
Black Male 1,322 of 7,019 (18.8%) 
Hispanic Male 599 of 3,475 (17.2%) 
White Female 22 of 156 (14.1%) 
Black Female 116 of 693 (16.7%) 
Hispanic Female 46 of 285 (16.1%) 
Weapon 
Force 
White Male 47 of 945 (5.0%) 
13.10(5)* 0.03 
Black Male 329 of 7,019 (4.7%) 
Hispanic Male 129 of 3,475 (3.7%) 
White Female 6 of 156 (3.8%) 
Black Female 19 of 693 (2.7%) 
Hispanic Female 7 of 285 (2.5%) 
Other 
Force 
White Male 34 of 945 (3.6%) 
4.30(5)* 0.02 
Black Male 187 of 7,019 (2.7%) 
Hispanic Male 86 of 3,475 (2.5%) 
White Female 4 of 156 (2.5%) 
Black Female 21 of 693 (3.0%) 
Hispanic Female 6 of 285 (2.1%) 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Policing has witnessed tremendous innovation over the last three decades, 
from developments in forensic science and body-worn cameras to widespread 
use of evidence-based policing strategies (e.g., hot spots and problem-oriented 
policing).199 Despite that innovation, the undercurrent of racial injustice in polic-
ing persists.200 A series of controversial police killings of people of color in 2014 
 
199  See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, 
Testing, and Tracking, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2013); KEVIN STROM, RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON POLICING STRATEGY IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL REPORT 4–4 to 4–13 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/gr 
ants/251140.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6WR-CCWF]. 
200  WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 1, at 159–61; Robert A. Brown, Policing in American 
History, 16 DU BOIS REV. 189, 193 (2019); see also Keisha N. Blain, Violence in Minneapolis 
Is Rooted in the History of Racist Policing in America, WASH. POST (May 30, 2020, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/30/violence-minneapolis-is-rooted-his-
tory-racist-policing-america/ [https://perma.cc/4GYA-5QCL]; David A. Harris, Why Police 
Violence Against Black People Persists—and What Can Be Done About It, FORTUNE (June 30, 
2020, 4:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/06/30/police-violence-brutality-black-racism/ [http 
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and 2015 led to public outrage, riots in some jurisdictions, and demands for po-
lice reform. The final report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Polic-
ing in 2015 serves as a roadmap for reform through identification of specific 
recommendations for building community trust and enhancing police accounta-
bility, and many police departments have sought to follow those recommenda-
tions.201 But five years and nine months after police in Ferguson, Missouri, killed 
Michael Brown, Minneapolis police killed George Floyd.202 Floyd’s death, along 
with the police killings of Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks, Jacob Blake, and 
others, reignited the national outrage over racial injustice in policing, demon-
strated by protests across the globe, legislative efforts to reform the police at the 
local, state, and federal level, and even calls to defund the police.203 The under-
current of racial injustice has not lessened in twenty-first century policing.204 
Police killings of unarmed minority citizens are the most extreme form of 
racial injustice. Despite their tragic nature, available evidence suggests police 
killings of citizens are rare events. For example, in 2019 police killed 999 citi-
zens, representing a terrible outcome in a small fraction of the millions of police–
 
s://perma.cc/L86A-RDTT]; Liz Mineo, Why America Can’t Escape Its Racist Roots, HARV. 
GAZETTE (June 4, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/06/orlando-patterson-
explains-why-america-cant-escape-its-racist-roots/ [https://perma.cc/98ZL-FV2H]. 
201  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1–4 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/task-
force/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK3N-BUSN]. 
202  Blain, supra note 200. 
203  Id.; Kevin Johnson & Kristin Phillips, ‘Perfect Storm’: Defund the Police, COVID-19 Lead 
to Biggest Police Budget Cuts in Decade, USA TODAY (July 31, 2020, 1:16 PM), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/31/defund-police-covid-19-force-deepest-cop-bud 
get-cuts-decade/5538397002/ [https://perma.cc/ETD2-U5ZR]. 
204  For an interesting discussion of why this continues, see generally Paul Oder, Opinion, Why 
the Rot Runs so Deep: Racist Policing Is Indisputable, and Leaders Have Done Almost Noth-
ing About It, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-ope 
d-riots-and-protests-symptom-failure-20200604-5nbmokixlrgsvhzv4rycnt4aji-story.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/E9J2-H3WQ]. 
     Sociologist Victor Rios and colleagues noted that some of the tensions associated with ra-
cially biased policing can be somewhat reduced with procedural justice techniques, such as 
using courtesy and respect during SQF encounters. Victor M. Rios, Greg Prieto & Jonathan 
M. Ibarraa, Mano Suave–Mano Dura: Legitimacy Policing and Latino Stop-and-Frisk, 85 AM. 
SOC. REV. 58, 72 (2020). Still, behaviors designed to increase perceptions of police legitimacy 
do not overcome civilian resistance to racialized policing strategies. Id.  
We suggest that police reforms related to improving race relations between law enforcement de-
partments and criminalized communities have to move beyond community policing and proce-
dural justice approaches. . . . To be effective, community policing, due process, harm reduction, 
and trust-building policing approaches must operate independently from such punitive strategies 
[like SQF]. Departments committed to community policing might consider de-emphasizing the 
stop-and-frisk and other investigatory stops as significant crime prevention strategies, and instead 
promote and reward a dignity policing model that allows criminalized civilians to feel safe and 
protected by officers and departmental culture. 
Id.  
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citizen interactions.205 Yet, the relatively rarity of such killings notwithstanding, 
there is no doubt that they disproportionately impact males of racial and ethnic 
minority backgrounds. Indeed, police kill Blacks at more than twice the rate that 
they kill Whites.206 
Other iterations of racial injustice in policing are far more frequent, and 
though they do not involve a loss of life, such activities can lead to severe emo-
tional and physical consequences for citizens and entire communities.207 Mass 
surveillance SQF programs aimed at communities of color perpetuate the racial 
injustice in U.S. policing.208 From 2004 through 2013, the NYPD conducted 
more than five million stops of mostly Black and Hispanic New Yorkers as part 
of a program that routinely violated the constitutional rights of New York’s citi-
zenry. The misuse and abuse of stop-and-frisk in Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, 
Pittsburgh, and New York illustrates that Williams and Murphy’s “minority 
view” of policing remains a stark reality.209 And the deaths of Eric Garner, Mi-
chael Brown, Freddie Gray, and most recently George Floyd, demonstrate the 
centrality of stop-and-frisk to the persistent racial crisis in policing because each 
encounter started with a stop-and-frisk. 
New York City has been the epicenter of the racialized use of SQF. We have 
re-told the New York history with SQF here, culminating in the 2013 ruling by 
a federal judge that the NYPD’s program amounted to widespread unconstitu-
tional racial profiling.210 However, most legal and scholarly attention has focused 
on who gets stopped, why,211 and what the effects of such stops might be on 
crime.212 What happens after the stop is a relatively untold part of the New York 
SQF story. Who is most likely to be frisked or searched? Who is most likely to 
have force used against them? Are there indications that the undercurrent of ra-
cial injustice persists after the stop? 
 
205  Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/po-
lice-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/WG7U-72XV] (Apr. 16, 2021). 
206  Id.; Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by Police Use 
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in the United States, 100 Black males will be killed by police compared to 39 White males). 
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In our prior work, we found strong evidence of racial injustice after the stop 
during the height of the NYPD SQF program.213 Our analysis of 2012 SQF data 
led us to conclude: “The findings suggest that minority citizens may be exposed 
to a racial or ethnic ‘double jeopardy,’ whereby they are subjected to both un-
constitutional stops and disparate rates of force during those stops.”214 By 2014, 
we found incremental progress in terms of an overall drop in SQF, reductions in 
geographic concentration of the strategy, and increases in the efficiency of stops 
as measured by higher rates of weapon and contraband seizures and higher rates 
of arrest—but racial disparities persisted.215 In this Article, we fast-forward five 
years and continue telling the NYPD SQF story. 
A. The Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness of SQF in New York 
Stops have declined precipitously in recent years, from 685,724 in 2011 to 
45,788 in 2014.216 According to the NYPD’s official SQF data, there were just 
13,459 stops in 2019, a 98% decrease from the height of the SQF program in 
2011. By any measure, this is an enormous decline. Notably, most index crimes 
remained at record-low levels in 2019, despite a slight uptick in homicides.217 
Our focus here is on post-stop outcomes—frisks, searches, and use of force—but 
we do note continual racial disparities among those stopped: 91% of citizens 
stopped by the NYPD in 2019 were Black or Hispanic. We need research to ex-
plore the reasons behind why these disparities persist. In plain terms, are these 
disparities explained by racial profiling? Or are they explained by something 
else? 
Our analyses allow us to comment on what happens after police stop sus-
pects in New York City, at least according to the official data. If those data are 
reliable and accurate, there have been significant improvements in the efficiency 
and effectiveness of SQF in New York. Consider that in 2011, just 1.2% of stops 
led to the confiscation of guns or other weapons; in 2019, that rate increased to 
weapons seizures in 9.9% of encounters that started with stops. In 2012, only 
6.1% of stops resulted in an arrest; in 2019, 32.1% of stops resulted in an arrest. 
 
213  Morrow, White & Fradella, supra note 12, at 369. 
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215  White, Fradella, Morrow & Mellom, supra note 17, at 52–59; see also John MacDonald & 
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marks, 36 JUST. Q. 954, 977 (2019) (similarly reporting that “racial disparities in SQF out-
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and place-based racial disparities in SQF rates dissipated” as a result of reforms enacted in the 
wake of the Floyd decision). 
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Put differently, as the NYPD’s use of SQF dropped by 98%, the hit and arrest 
rates increased by 725% and 426%, respectively (calculated as percent-change). 
Given the low burden of proof required for a stop, these increases represent a 
sea-change in the efficiency and effectiveness of reported SQFs, suggesting the 
NYPD has largely abandoned its original mass-surveillance SQF program. The 
NYPD’s reported use of SQF in 2019 reflects the original intent of the Terry 
ruling—use of stop-and-frisk as a particularized tactic supported by reasonable 
suspicion—better than any other time since the implementation of SQF.218 But 
the “suspiciously low” number of stops the NYPD reported during that year sug-
gests these findings may need to be taken with a grain of salt.219 
The increases in weapon confiscations and arrests also translate into notable 
changes in two of the three post-stop outcomes examined in the current study. 
Though the percentage of stops accompanied by subsequent frisks has changed 
little (55.9% in 2012 versus 57.4% in 2019), searches and the use of force have 
both become more common. The percentage of stops resulting in full-blown 
searches increased from 8.3% in 2012 to 37.5% in 2019. The increase in percent-
age of searches is likely tied to the increased confiscation of weapons, which 
suggests far more accurate assessments of reasonable suspicion than at the height 
of the SQF program, which in turn, explains the increase in the arrest percentage. 
The percentage of stops in which force was used increased from 14.2% in 2012 
to 25% in 2019. Prior research consistently shows use of force is more common 
in encounters ending in arrest (approximately 20%).220 Thus, the increase in the 
use of force by police is likely a function of the increase in arrests. 
B. The Role of Race/Ethnicity and Sex in Frisk and Search Decisions 
The value added by the increased efficiency and effectiveness of SQF could 
be undermined by continued racial disparities in frisks and searches. We noted 
above that racial disparities persist in those who were stopped (91% were Black 
or Hispanic, 61% and 30%, respectively), and those disparities carry over to who 
was frisked and searched. Of the 7,213 frisks conducted, 93.3% involved Black 
or Hispanic citizens (62.5% and 30.8%, respectively). Of the 4,655 searches con-
ducted, 90.8% involved Black or Hispanic citizens (59.2% and 31.6%, respec-
tively). Males are the disproportionate targets of stops (91%), and that also per-
sists with frisks (95.3%) and searches (92.6%). What explains the racial/ethnic 
 
218  Law professors David Rudovsky and David A. Harris argue that empirical data, like hit 
rates, “can provide police departments with critical information regarding the most salient 
predictors of criminal conduct and weapon possession.” David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, 
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of NYPD stops in 2019, Khan, supra note 15, we would be wary of policies being created 
around the factors associated with the hit rates from that year. 
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and sex disparities in frisks and searches? When controlling for other relevant 
factors, are citizen race/ethnicity and sex significant predictors of who gets 
frisked and searched? 
Results from our multi-level regression models show that, when controlling 
for other relevant encounter- and precinct-level variables, citizen race/ethnicity 
is not a significant predictor of getting frisked or getting searched; Black and 
Hispanic citizens were no more likely to be frisked or searched than White citi-
zens. Rather, frisk and search decisions are explained by a series of encounter-
level variables, most notably weapon carrying and suspected engagement in vi-
olent crime and drug transactions.221 Citizen sex (male) and age (younger) also 
predict frisk and search decisions. The importance of citizen sex is also reflected 
in the joint-effects models: females of any race/ethnicity are less likely to be 
frisked and searched than males, and race/ethnicity only comes into play when 
comparing males and females across racial/ethnic categories, with one exception: 
Hispanic males are more likely to be searched compared to White males. 
No precinct-level variables predict frisk or stop decisions either. The percent 
of residents that are Black or Hispanic in a precinct is not associated with frisk 
and search decisions, nor are measures of concentrated disadvantage and 
crime.222 
Prior research has demonstrated the disproportionate effects of SQF on mi-
nority communities,223 and our analyses do not explore this important issue (i.e., 
who is stopped and why). However, we can say with some degree of certainty 
that social ecology does not influence who gets frisked or searched; thus, the 
social ecological factors that may contribute to ongoing racial disparities appear 
to concern the decision to initiate a stop. 
Overall, and again assuming the validity of the NYPD’s 2019 SQF data, the 
race/ethnicity findings from post-stop outcomes are positive. Though Black and 
Hispanic New Yorkers still disproportionately felt the effects of SQF in 2019, 
citizens’ race/ethnicity did not explain who was frisked or searched by NYPD 
officers. This finding is especially important when coupled with the findings 
above on the enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of stops. 
C. The Role of Race/Ethnicity and Sex in Use of Force Decision-Making 
Our conclusions about the use of force are constrained by the simplicity of 
the analyses and the infrequency of the outcome. Parsing out the relatively few 
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use-of-force cases across citizen race/ethnicity and sex short-circuits our ability 
to employ multi-level regression modeling. At the descriptive level, the differ-
ences in the use of force across race/ethnicity and sex appear negligible and prac-
tically non-significant, as evidenced by the Cramer’s V values. For example, of 
the 7,712 Black citizens who were stopped, 348 (4.5%) experienced weapon 
force. Of the 3,760 Hispanic citizens who were stopped, 136 (3.6%) experienced 
weapon force. And of the 1,101 White citizens who were stopped, 53 (4.8%) 
experienced weapon force. Still, given the racial/ethnic disparities among those 
stopped, Black and Hispanic citizens experienced most uses of force. In fact, of 
the 3,126 stops in which NYPD officers reporting using some level of force, 
1,994 (63.9%) involved Black citizens and 873 (27.9%) involved Hispanic citi-
zens. Thus, a whopping 91.8% of the total uses of force in 2019 occurred against 
Blacks and Hispanics.224 These seemingly contradictory findings on use of force 
are explained by the sheer differences in the volume of stops of Black and His-
panic citizens. Future research should explore the interplay between citizen 
race/ethnicity and use of force by including additional years of data that would 
support the requisite multi-level regression modeling. 
D. Final Thoughts 
The undercurrent of racial injustice in policing persists in 2020, and the mis-
use of stop-and-frisk remains one of the most prominent features of that phenom-
ena. During the 1990s and 2000s, the NYPD’s use of SQF epitomized this racial 
injustice, but the available evidence suggests much has changed since Judge 
Scheindlin’s ruling in 2013. The number of stops has declined dramatically, as 
has the geographic concentration of those stops.225 Weapons confiscations and 
arrests have increased dramatically, and results of our analyses show that, in 
2019, Black and Hispanic citizens were no more likely to be frisked or searched 
than White citizens (when controlling for relevant encounter- and precinct-level 
factors). Still, racial disparities persist in who is stopped, and questions remain 
about racial disparities in the use of force during SQF encounters. 
Based on our examination of SQF data in 2014, we concluded: “In sum, the 
findings presented here show that the NYPD has made significant progress since 
2011, and the proper mechanisms are in place to ensure that the department will 
continue to move toward widespread constitutional policing.”226 The results from 
2019 show continued progress in post-stop outcomes, but the NYPD still has 
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work to do to address racial and ethnic disparities that persist with regard to the 
people who get stopped in the first place.227 
 
227  For a provocative proposal to combatting continuing racial disparities in SQF, see Aziz Z. 
Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of 
Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2458, 2461 (2017) (arguing that rather than ap-
proaching SQF racial disparities through contemporary constitutional law frameworks, statis-
tical evidence of disparate impact, even in the absence of discriminatory purpose—like that 
used in “employment discrimination and fair housing contexts”—should be recognized as a 
means of demonstrating that the exercise of police discretion has been used in ways that per-
petuate racial injustice). 
